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Recent Cases
DIVORCE-SHOULD CONNIVANCE OR COLLUSION DEFEAT
A RECRIMINATORY DEFENSE IN MISSOURI?
Day v. Day'
Carl and Margaret Day were married April 13, 1935, and separated January 1,
1958. After approximately 10 years of separation Carl brought suit against
Margaret for divorce. The children were emancipated. Margaret contested the
divorce with a general denial of the allegations in the petition. At trial Carl
admitted that he had had sexual relations with other women since the time
of separation in 1958. The trial court refused to grant Carl a divorce. In affirming, the Kansas City Court of Appeals followed the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision in Hoffman v. Hoffman 2 by saying "'[i]f both parties have a right to
divorce, neither party has.' "3 In so holding the court followed a long line of
4
cases recognizing recrimination as a defense to divorce in Missouri.
The trial court in Day v. Day based its decision on the determination that
petitioner's adulterous conduct was a recriminatory defense.5 The petitioner on
appeal asserted that the wife's failure to testify prevented the trial court from
knowing if the wife had consented to his misconduct, which consent, if given,
would operate as connivance to deprive the wife of her grounds for a divorce.
If the petitioner's wife did not have grounds for a divorce, the defense of recrimination would not apply. The appellate court, however, dismissed this
argument by saying "[s]uch evidence of collusion could only have created a
further bar to divorce.... "6
1. 433 S.W.2d 52 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968).
2. 43 Mo. 547 (1869).
3. 433 S.W.2d 52, 54 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968). It would be more accurate
to say if both parties have grounds for a divorce, neither party may have a
divorce.
4. E.g., Gregg v. Gregg, 416 S.W.2d 672 (K. C. Mo. App. 1967); Rv. M-,
383 S.W.2d 894 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964); Pippas v. Pippas, 330 S.W.2d
132 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959); Patterson v. Patterson, 215 S.W.2d 761 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1948); Stevens v. Stevens, 158 S.W.2d 238 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942); Ranklin v. Ranklin, 17 S.W.2d 381 (K.C. Mo. App. 1929); Wehrenbrecht v. Wehrenbrecht, 200 Mo. App. 452, 207 S.W. 290 (St. L. Ct. App. 1919); and Miller v.
Miller, 14 Mo. App. 418 (St. L. Ct. App. 1883).
5. Day v. Day, 433 S.W.2d 52, 54 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968). Section 452.030,
RSMo 1959 begins "[i]f it shall appear to the court .... ."Thus, it is not
necessary for recriminatory matter to be pleaded as an affirmative defense or in
a cross-bill for divorce. The court may recognize the recriminatory matter on
its own motion even if, as in the Day case, the answer contains only a general
denial.
6. Day v. Day, supra note 5, at 54.
(588)
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Recrimination was initially a rule of property in Roman law involving a
wife's rights to recover her dowery upon the disolution of her marriage.1 The
early English law, which allowed no absolute divorces, converted this doctrine into
a defense to divorce a mensa et thoro. Later, when absolute divorces were
allowed, recrimination was transformed by the English courts into a bar to
absolute divorce. The courts in this country have always allowed recrimination as
a defense to absolute divorce.
Although recrimination is a common law defense in Missouri, the doctrine has
been recognized in the divorce statutes. Section 452.030, RSMo states that "[i]f
... both parties have been guilty of adultery, then no divorce shall be granted."8
Section 452.090, RSMo requires that the court, before granting a divorce in
ex parte proceedings, must be satisfied that the petitioner is the innocent and
injured party. 9 In other than ex parte proceedings, these statutes on their face
appear to limit the defense of recrimination to adultery in actions for divorce on
the grounds of adultery. Missouri courts, however, have allowed recrimination as
a defense (based on conduct other than adultery) to actions for divorce on
grounds other than adultery. 10
The principal reason Missouri courts allow recrimination as a defense in a
divorce action regardless of the grounds is the Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of section 452.010, RSMo. Section 452.010 sets forth the grounds upon
which a party may obtain a divorce in Missouri and provides that the party
obtaining the divorce must be the injured party. Prior to 1849 the Missouri statutes
required a party to be both innocent and injured before the court could grant a
divorce. In 1849 the requirement that the party be innocent was removed from
the statute, leaving the requirement that the person seeking the divorce be the
injured party." The Missouri Supreme Court in Hoffman v. Hoffman 12 construed
this statute, which preceded section 452.010, to require the party obtaining the
divorce to be both innocent and injured, notwithstanding the fact that the
requirement of innocence had been deleted from the statute twenty years earlier.
The Missouri courts have similarly followed this construction in construing section
452.010 to mean that the person obtaining the divorce must be both innocent and
injured. Because the courts interpret the statute to require the party seeking the
divorce to be innocent as well as injured, recrimination is allowed as a defense
7. For a more complete analysis and history of recrimination, see H. CLARK,
12.12 (1968) and Beamer, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings, 10 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 213 (1942).
8. Section 452.030, RSMo 1959.
9. Section 452.090, RSMo 1959, states in part: "[i]n all cases where the
proceedings shall be ex parte, the court shall, before it grants the divorce, require
proof of the good conduct of petitioner, and be satisfied that he or she is an innocent and injured party."
10. E.g., Stone v. Stone, 378 S.W.2d 824 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964); Cody v.
Cody, 233 S.W.2d 777 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950); Jones v. Jones, 208 Mo. App.
632, 235 S.W. 481 (Spr. Ct. App. 1921); Willett v. Willett, 196 S.W. 1058 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1917); Elder v. Elder, 186 S.W. 530 (K.C. Mo. App. 1916); Coe
v. Coe, 98 Mo. App. 472, 72 S.W. 707 (K.C. Ct. App. 1903).
11. Mo. Laws 1849, at 49.
12. 43 Mo. 547 (1869).
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS §
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to actions for divorce on grounds other than adultery. As to the "degree of innocence" necessary to obtain a divorce, the Missouri courts hold that to be recriminatory, the conduct must itself constitute grounds for a divorce.' 3
Collusion arises when the parties agree that a divorce will be obtained by
one of the parties based upon (1) false testimony, (2) the other party's agreement
not to contest the divorce, or (3) an agreement that one of the parties appear to
commit an act that will give the other grounds for a divorce.' 4 The defense of
collusion is recognized by sections 452.030 and 452.040, RSMo. The essence of
the defense of collusion is the agreement between the parties. If collusion is
found by the court, the person seeking the divorce will be denied relief.15
Connivance, on the other hand, is the complaining party's intentional inducement or active procurement of the commission of acts by the other party
which can be used as grounds for divorce. 10 The defense of connivance is found
in section 452.030 RSMo, which states that if the complainant consents to the
injury or offense complained of, no divorce shall be granted. 17 The essential
element of connivance is the express or implied consent of the complaining party
to the acts of which he is complaining.' 8 Considering the distinction between
collusion and connivance, the petitioner in Day apparently was trying to prove
connivance by the wife (i.e. expressed or implied consent to his misconduct)
rather than collusion between the parties as stated by the court. In Day if either
collusion or connivance had been proved, it would have defeated the wife's
grounds for divorce and there would have been no place for recrimination. 19
Only a few jurisdictions (not including Missouri) have reported cases dealing directly with the question of permitting collusion or connivance to defeat
13. See, e.g., Gregg v. Gregg, 416 S.W.2d 672 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); and
cases cited note 10, supra.
14. For a more complete discussion of collusion see H. CLARK, LAVw OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 12.9 (1968); and Moore, An Analysis of Collusion and
Connivance, Bars to a Divorce, 36 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 193 (1968).
15. E.g., Bishop v. Bishop, 151 S.W.2d 553 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941); Welsh
v. Welsh, 230 Mo. App. 1006, 93 S.W.2d 264 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936); Donohue v.
Donohue, 159 Mo. App. 610, 141 S.W. 465 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911); and Gentry v.
Gentry, 67 Mo. App. 550 (K.C. Ct. App. 1896).
16. For a more complete discussion of connivance see H. CLARK, LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 12.8 (1968); and Moore, An Analysis of Collusion and
Connivance, Bars to a Divorce, 36 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 193 (1968).
17. § 452.030, RSMo 1959.
18. The Kansas City Court of Appeals has defined connivance as "the complaint's consent, express or implied, to the misconduct alleged as grounds for a
divorce." Herriford v. Herriford 169 Mo. App. 641, 648, 155 S.W. 855, 857
(K.C. Ct. App. 1913).
19. Missouri courts have long held that before conduct will be deemed
recriminatory, it must be such conduct as would entitle the other party to a
divorce.
[I]f the party seeking the divorce has been guilty of conduct that would
entitle the opposite party to one, he or she must fail, notwithstanding
the evidence might otherwise be sufficient. This rule does not apply to
conduct, however reprehensible, that would not entitle the other party to
a divorce. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 43 Mo. 547, 551 (1868).
See also cases cited note 4 supra.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

3

1969]

RECENT CASES

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 7

the defense of recrimination. 20 This is probably due to the fact that most
divorce actions are not vigorously contested and only a small percentage of those
contested are appealed. Also, the doctrine of recrimination has been weakened in
many jurisdictions by (1) judicial discretion in refusing to regard many instances of misconduct as sufficient to be recriminatory, 2 1 (2) the doctrine of
comparative rectitude which allows the court to grant the party least at fault
the divorce,2 2 and (3) an increase in the number of jurisdictions that allow
24
divorces on grounds other than fault.2 3 Recently there has been much criticism
of the doctrine of recrimination, but the Day decision indicates that recrimination
is still a very effective bar to a divorce in Missouri.
L. THoms ELLISTON

20. In the case of X v. Y, 103 N.J. Super. 218, 247 A.2d 28 (1968), which
closely resembles Day on its facts, X (the wife), having been deserted by Y in
1956, brought suit for divorce in 1967 against Y on the grounds of his desertion.
At the trial, X admitted that she had had sexual relations with Z since 1960. A
child had been born of this relationship with Z in 1961. The court refused to
accept X's confessed adultery as recriminatory matter and granted the divorce.
See also King v. Yeager, 41 N.J. 594, 198 A.2d 443 (1964); Klekamp v. Klekamp,
275 Ill. 98, 113 N.E. 852 (1916).
21. E.g., DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. App. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952);
Steward v. Steward, 158 Fla. 326, 29 So. 2d 247 (1946); Howay v. Howay, 74 Idaho
492, 264 P.2d 691 (1953); Lassen v. Lassen, 134 Kan. 436, 7 P.2d 120 (1953);
Burns v. Burns, 400 P.2d 642 (Mont. 1965); King v. Yeager, 41 N.J. 594, 198
A.2d 443 (1964); White v. White, 281 P.2d 745 (Okla. 1955); Steiger v. Steiger,
4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418 (1956); Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 679, 74 P.2d 189
(1937).
22. E.g., Hensley v. Hensley, 213 Ark. 755, 212 S.W.2d 551 (1948); Eals v.
Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952); Gabler v. Gabler, 72 Nev. 325, 304
P.2d 404 (1956); Dearth v. Dearth, 141 Pa. Super. 344, 15 A.2d 37 (1940);
Marr v. Marr, 191 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Hendricks v. Hendricks,
123 Utah 178, 257 P.2d 366 (1953); and Huff v. Huff, 178 Wash. 684, 35 P.2d
86 (1934).
23. See Wadlington, Divorce without Fault without Perjury, 52 VA. L. Rxv.
32 (1966).
24. E.g., Tenney, Divorce without Fault: The Next Step-A Model for
Change, 46 NEB. L. Rlv. 24 (1967); Wadlington, Divorce without Fault without
Perjury, 52 VA. L. Rxv. 32 (1966); and Note, Recrimination as a Bar to Divorce:
Mitigating the Mandate, 51 IowA L. REv. 184 (1965).
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JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF RESULTS OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCETHE PARAFFIN TEST AND THE POLYGRAPH
State v. Fieldsl
James Marvin Fields was convicted of armed robbery in the Circuit Court
of Greene County. The state's evidence included the results of a polygraph, or
lie detector examination of defendant, and testimony by a police officer as to
the results of a paraffin test 2 administered shortly after defendant's arrest. The
lie detector test was given pursuant to a request and stipulation executed by
defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor asserting the admissibility of the resuits of such a test and waiving all objections to its admission. 3 The results of
the polygraph test were admitted at trial over defendant's objection that an individual cannot waive his constitutional rights with regard to polygraph testing.
The results of the paraffin test were admitted over objections concerning their
reliability and conclusiveness.4 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri held
that the paraffin test was admissible. The lie detector evidence was also held admissible, when all parties had stipulated before the court to its admissibility. The
court held that defendant's fifth amendment rights were expressly waived by the
stipulation and that there was no evidence of any compulsion upon defendant
to take the polygraph examination.
The lie detector has had a stormy career in the courts, and a discussion of
its travails is beyond the scope of this note. Suffice it to say that in no jurisdiction are the results of a polygraph examination admissible to prove the guilt
or innocence of a criminal defendant. The dual reasons for its inadmissibility are
that the polygraph has not achieved the degree of reliability or scientific accuracy
necessary to be considered competent evidence, and that the prejudicial effect

1. 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968).
2. A paraffin, or dermal nitrate, test is a procedure designed to ascertain
whether a suspect has recently fired a gun, particularly a pistol. The subject's
hands are coated with melted paraffin which then dries and is peeled from the
hand. If the suspect has recently fired a weapon, the parffin picks up small particles
of nitrate and other powder residues from the pores of his hand. These residues
react in a certain way when a chemical solution is placed upon the paraffin.
3. The stipulation was an agreement whereby defendant waived "absolutely
and irrevocably each and every objection to the use in evidence by the prosecution
of the results of said test," as well as any objections to their "relevancy, materiality, competency, accuracy, constitutionality, reliability .
State v. Fields, 434
S.W.2d 507, 511 (Mo. 1968).
4. Objection was also made to the use of evidence of the actions of a
bloodhound. Here, the bloodhound was taken to the point of the arrest and
followed a trail back to the scene of the robbery, a distance of between 300
and 400 yards. The court held such evidence admissible upon the establishment
of the animal's pedigree and experience, affirming prior decisions of State v. Long,
336 Mo. 630, 80 S.W.2d 154 (1935); State v. Freyer, 330 Mo. 62, 48 S.W.2d 894
(1932); State v. Steely, 827 Mo. 16, 38 S.W.2d 988 (1930); State v. Barnes,
289 S.W. 562 (Mo. 1926); State v. Dooms, 280 Mo. 84, 217 S.W. 48 (1919); see
also Annot., 94 A.L.R. 418 (1935).
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is so high. The courts have, however, begun to take a different stance in relation to the polygraph when the defendant has submitted to the test voluntarily
and has entered into a stipulation concerning the admissibility of the results
obtained.
The first such lie detector case was People v. Houser,6 a 1948 California decision where the defendant, charged with child molestation, consented to the
test and executed a written stipulation that the results would be admissible
whether favorable to himself or to the state. When the admission of results unfavorable to defendant was challenged on appeal, Mr. justice Griffin replied:
It would be difficult to hold that defendant should now be permitted on
this appeal to take advantage of any claim that such operator was not an
expert and that as to the results of the test such evidence was inadmissible,
merely because it happened to indicate he was not telling the truth. .... 7
The Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. McNamara,8 relying upon Houser,
affirmed a conviction in which lie detector evidence was used, holding it admissible by reason of defendant's stipulation. Ariozna in State v. Valdez9 allowed
such evidence to come in upon stipulation if certain criteria were met.10 In
a civil case decided under California law,"1 a federal district court held that the
results of a polygraph test concerning the disappearance of a valuable ring were
properly admitted when both parties had stipulated their admissibility.
Lie detector evidence has not always been admitted upon stipulation. In the
oft-cited case of LeFevre v. State,' 2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held lie de-

5. State v. Weindorf, 361 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1962); State v. Stidham, 305
S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1957); State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945). See also
State v. Hudson, 289 S.W. 920 (Mo. 1926), holding that the results of truth serum
tests are inadmissible; Stone v. Earp, 381 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951),
a Michigan chancery decision wherein the trial court had ordered the parties
to take a lie detector test, the results of which would be weighed in its decision.
On appeal this was held to be error, but not prejudicial error, lending some
credence to the suggestion that the exclusion of lie detector results be limited
to criminal cases. For discussions of reliability of test results, see: F. INBAU, LIE
DETECTION AND CRIINAL INTERROGATION 86 et seq. (2nd ed. 1948); J. Coghlan,
The Lie Box Lies, 7 TRIAL LAWYER'S GumE 173 (1964).
6. 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948).
7. Id. at 695, 193 P.2d at 942.
8. 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
9. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
10. The Arizona Court required that: (1) the prosecutor, defendant, and
defendant's counsel sign a written stipulation; (2) the judge retain descretion
to exclude the evidence if the expert's qualifications are not established to his
satisfaction; (3) the opposing party be allowed the right of cross examination
regarding the examiner's qualification, the conditions under which the test was
administered, limitations of the technique, possibility of error, and any other
matter the judge deems pertinent; (4) a limiting instruction be given that the
testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime, but
merely indicates whether defendant was telling the truth when the examination
was given. State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962).
11. Herman v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 283 F.Supp. 33 (C.D. Cal. 1966),
aff'd per curiam, 396 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1968).
12. 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss4/7

6

MISSOURI
et al.:LAW
RecentREVIEW
Cases

[Vol. 34

tector results, in the absence of expert testimony, inadmissible when offered by
the defendant pursuant to the stipulation. No reason was given for this holding.
State v. Trimble,13 a 1961 New Mexico case, reached a similar result, holding lie
detector evidence always inadmissible, without considering the results in Houser
or McNamara.
Somewhere between the extremes found in Trimble and Houser lie a group
of cases in which the courts have given strong indication that, should the facts
4
present themselves, they may be willing to follow the reasoning in Houser.1 It
is within this group that the Fields case falls, and its limitations should be carefully noted. In Fields the Missouri Supreme Court did not reach the issue of
whether questions of reliability and competency were cured by a stipulation
because no objection was made at trial on these grounds. If trial counsel had objected to the admission of such evidence on the grounds that it was incompetent
for any purpose by reason of its unreliability and scientific inaccuracy, the court
would have been faced with the same problem as the courts in Houser,
McNamara, and Trimble. It would have had to decide whether to follow the
growing group of jurisdictions which will unquestionably accept such evidence
upon stipulation, or to put an end to the lie detector question in Missouri once
and for all. Judge Eager was quite explicit, saying, "We decline now to rule
upon the admissibility of this evidence from the standpoint of the scientific
acceptance or non-acceptance of such tests or their accuracy."15 Although the
court would not consider Houser, Valdez, or McNamara, believing that the
holdings in these cases were not relevant to the issue on appeal, it did indicate

13. 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
14. See State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947), where the court
by way of dictum indicated that if the parties stipulate the introduction of the
test results as evidence at trial, such evidence is admissible. See also Colbert v.
Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957), holding an oral agreement to be
bound by the results of a lie detector test insufficient and intimating that more
formality, presumably a writing, was required for such evidence to be admissible.
In the subsequent case of Conley v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1964),
a written stipulation as to admissibility was insufficient to make the evidence admissible when it was shown that defendant was illiterate, was not apprised of his
rights, and was without counsel when the stipulation was made. The same result
was reached on a similar state of facts in People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302,
189 N.E.2d 260 (1963). The Illinois case of People v. Potts, 74 Ill. App. 2d 301,
220 N.E.2d 251 (1966), held lie detector evidence upon written stipulation inadmissible when the examiner's qualifications were not shown. In State v. LaForest,
106 N.H. 159, 161, 207 A.2d 429, 431 (1965), the court said:
In the circumstances of the present case the results of polygraph tests
are not admissible on the basis of the stipulation involved in this proceeding. We leave open the question whether polygraph tests may be admitted where all parties and their counsel with the approval of the
court have agreed by a stipulation which leaves no room for doubt
that the results of the tests may be admissible in evidence regardless of
their outcome.
In State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J. Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (1961), the court implied
that, had the admissibility of lie detector evidence been stipulated, it would
have been admitted. See also Commonwealth v. McKinley, 181 Pa. Super. 610,
123 A.2d 735 (1956).
15. State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507, 513 (Mo. 1968).
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6
that it might be receptive to the Houser rationale should the issue be presented1
The court was willing to admit the paraffin test results as evidence upon
agreement of the parties, or where the test operator's qualifications are established,
the test is run in a standard manner, the procedure is adequately dscribed to the
jury, and the operator is present in court for cross-examination.17 The court
conceded that the results of the paraffin test were not conclusive evidence that defendant fired a gun. It noted other causes, such as the handling of certain types
of fertilizer and the use of old style kitchen matches, which might produce. a
positive reaction. However, feeling that such a possibility was remote, and upon
corroborative testimony by the expert that the reaction was caused by particles
positively identified as gunpowder, it affirmed the trial court's action, stating that
circumstantial evidence need not be conclusive to be relevant and competent.

This decision places Missouri within the minority of jurisdictions accepting
the results of paraffin testing as evidence. Courts which have excluded the results
of paraffin tests have done so largely for the same reasons used to support the exclusion of lie detector evidence.' 8 Brooke v. People,19 a 1959 Colorado decision,
states: "[W]e hold that the paraffin test has not gained . . . that degree of reliablity to justify courts approving its use in criminal cases." 20 In fact, only five
21
other decisions were found by this writer allowing such evidence, each stating
that paraffin evidence is in the same category as blood tests, fingerprints, breath
tests, and radar; that is, it is a technological test which has reached a degree
22
of reliability accepted by the courts.

16. After a discussion of the extensive nature of the waiver of objections
in the stipulation, including competency, reliability, and accuracy, the court
said, "It would be almost unthinkable to permit defendant now to reverse his
position and oppose the reception of this evidence for the sole reason that the
results were not favorable to him." State v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507, 513 (Mo.
1968).
17. State v. Fields, supra note 16, at 516.
18. Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959); Born v. State,
397 P.2d 924 (Okla. Crim. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965); Clarke v.
State, 218 Tenn. 259, 402 S.W.2d 863 (1966).
19. 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959).
20. Id. at 393, 339 P.2d at 996.
21. Henson v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 647, 266 S.W.2d 864 (1953); Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 (1936); People v. Simpson, 5
Mich. App. 479, 146 N.W.2d 828 (1966). See also Harris v. State, 239 Ark. 771,
394 S.W.2d 135 (1965); and State v. Foster, 44 Hawaii 403, 354 P.2d 960 (1960),
where paraffin results were admitted with little discussion by the courts.
22. The reliability of the results of paraffin tests has been seriously challenged.
In Turkel and Lipman, Unreliability of Dermal Nitrate Test for Gunpowder, 46
J. Cmi L.C. & P.S. 281 (1955), it was found that the test was subject to a
gross error of 13 per cent and the results were inconclusive on 75 per cent of the
tests. Additional substances causing positive reactions were tobacco, tobacco ash,
pharmaceuticals, and urine. It was concluded that the paraffin test is "less than
worthless." Id. at 283.
A similar inquiry was made by two forensic scientists who concurred with
the findings above, stating that the test was of little or no value. See Cowan and
Purdon, A Study of the Paraffin Test, 12 J. FoR. Sci. 19 (1967).
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Fields represents a step in the liberalization of Missouri's rules of evidence in
an area in which few courts are wont to be liberal. The judicial sanction of the
paraffin test as evidence in a criminal case shows a regard for its usefulness as a
police tool and a recognition of the jury's ability to weigh the results so obtained, but largely ignores criticism of its reliability.23 The limitation of this
holding regarding lie detectors was compelled by the failure of counsel to
make the proper objection at trial. The next logical step would seem to be
complete adoption of the rule that lie detector evidence is admissible upon
stipulation notwithstanding an objection as to its competency. The rationale
for such a rule is obvious. A defendant's attorney will not likely agree to allow
his client to submit to the test unless he is reasonably confident that defendant is
innocent, hence such a rule would lead to more exhaustive investigation of the
merits of the case. 24 Furthermore, a defendant should not be able to hedge his
bet by taking a lie detector test under stipulation, knowing that if adverse results are obtained he can back out by repudiating his stipulation. Similarly,
should a prosecutor renege under a rule similar to that in the Trimble case,
serious due process questions arise. For these reasons, the adoption of the
Houser rule admitting lie detector evidence on stipulation seems the best way to
deal with the problem should it arise in the future.
KENNETH W.

JOHNSON

23. Ibid.
24. Klienfeld, The Detection of Deception-A Resume, 8 Fed. B.J. 153, 164
(1947); Reid, The Lie Detector in Court, 4 DEPAUL L. RaV. 31, 42 (1954).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CHRONIC ALCOHOLISM AS A DEFENSE
TO A CHARGE OF PUBLIC INTOXICATION
Powell v. Texas'
Leroy Powell was tried and convicted in the Corporation Court of Austin,
Texas, of being intoxicated in a public place in violation of the Texas Penal
Code.2 He appealed to the County Court of Travis County, Texas, where a
trial de novo was held.3 His counsel urged that Powell was a chronic alcoholic
and that he did not appear in public in a state of intoxication of his own
volition. The trial judge ruled that chronic alcoholism was not a defense to
the charge and Powell was convicted. The conviction was appealed directly to
the United States Supreme Court. In a split decision, the conviction was
affirmed, with the Court holding that chronic alcoholism in itself is not a defense
to the charge of public intoxication.
This decision was surprising since previous federal court cases had pointed
to an opposite result. In 1962, the Supreme Court held in Robinson v.
California4 that a narcotics addict could not be punished for the condition
or status of being addicted. 5 The court stated:
It is unlikely that any state at this moment in history would attempt
to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a leper,
or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.6
The state admitted that a narcotics addict is mentally and physically ill,7 and
since the statute made it a crime to use or be addicted to narcotics, the Supreme
Court concluded that the statute authorized criminal punishment for a recognized
illness. Under these circumstances, even a 90-day sentence was held to be a cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
The court did not invalidate the portion of the statute proscribing the use of narcotics but only the portion authorizing criminal liability solely for drug addiction.
The related problem of alcoholism came to the attention of the appellate courts

1. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
2. Txx. PEN. CODE art. 477 (1952). "Whoever shall get drunk or be found
in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his
own, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars."
3. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). The first time the case appeared in
a court of record was in the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, any facts
as to occurrences or findings of the trial court are taken from the opinions
expressed by Supreme Court justices.
4. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1957):
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the
use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction
of a person licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics.
(emphasis added)
The emphasized portion was deleted from the statute in the 1963 edition.
6. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
7. Id. at 667.
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in Driver v. Hinnant.8 Driver had been convicted of public intoxication in
violation of a North Carolina statute.9 The court of appeals granted a writ of
habeas corpus based on the authority of Robinson. Driver was found to be a
chronic alcoholic unable to control his actions. The court stated: "the evidence
... conclusively proved him a chronic alcoholic, his inebriation in public view an
involuntary exhibition of the infirmity."10 Driver had been convicted for the
same offense over 200 times during the last 35 years and had been incarcerated
nearly two-thirds of his life for these infractions.
The court of appeals stated that to convict Driver for the crime of public
intoxication would violate the eighth amendment as a cruel and unusual punishment because chronic alcoholism "is now almost universally accepted as a
disease" and "[o]bviously includes appearances in public." This decision was
based upon the Robinson case which, the court stated, "sustains, if not commands,
the view we take."' 1 The possibility of civil commitment was clearly left open
as long as the alcoholic was not marked a criminal. 12
The same question was decided by a different court of appeals in Easter v.
District of Columbia.'3 Easter was convicted of violating a statute similar to
the one in Powell and Driver.14 The court reviewing Easter's conviction had, in
addition to the eighth amendment, an act of congress authorizing the courts
to take judicial notice that a chronic alcoholic is a sick person in need of medical
help.' 5 Basing its opinion largely on the authority of Robinson and Driver, the
Easter court said that the chronic alcoholic is not to be considered voluntarily
intoxicated, does not have the necessary mens rea to commit a crime, and therefore, cannot be sentenced as a criminal.16 These conclusions were made with
full realization that no rehabilitative or caretaking facilities were available.
An appendix to the opinion cited several medical and legal authorities to
support the court's position.' 7
It should be noted, however, that not all recent cases have followed the course
of Robinson, Driver and Easter. In Seattle v. Hill,1 8 the defendant had been

8. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1951). "If any person shall be found drunk
or intoxicated on the public highway, or at any public place or meeting, in any
county, township, city, town, village ... he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor...."
Since Driver a clause has been added which authorizes chronic alcoholism as a
defense to the charge of public intoxication. If a verdict of not guilty by reason of
chronic alcoholism is reached, the court is authorized to institute civil commitment
procedures. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (Supp. 1967).
10. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 763 (4th Cir. 1966).
11. Id. at 764.
12. Id. at 765.
13. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
14. D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-128 (1961):
No person shall in the District of Columbia drink any alcoholic beverage
in any street, alley, park, or parking ....
No such person shall be drunk
or intoxicated in any street, alley, park, or parking ....
15. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-501 (1961).
16. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
17. Id. at 56.
18. 72 Wash. 2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967).
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convicted of disorderly conduct after being found lying on a public sidewalk. In
upholding the conviction, the Washington Supreme Court arrived at three major
conclusions. First, jail sentences do have some beneficial effect on the chronic
alcoholic. 19 Second, the disorderly conduct ordinance was a public welfare
ordinance and therefore no finding of intent or mens rea was required. Third,
even if the court believed that there were better ways to treat alcoholics and
that a reversal of the conviction would result in establishment of rehabilitation
centers, the initiation of such a policy would be within the province of the legislature rather than the cour 20
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to a case in
which it was asked to give an opinon as to the constitutionality of convicting a
chronic alcoholic of public intoxication. That case was Budd v. California2 '
where the trial court had made no findings of fact as to whether the defendant
was an alcoholic since it had ruled that, as a matter of law, chronic alcoholism was
not a defense to the charge. Justices Fortas and Douglas dissented from the
denial of certiorari because they believed that the Driver and Easter courts had
correctly applied the medical and sociological data concerning chronic alcoholics
in light of the holding in the Robinson decision.
In Powell, Justice Marshall's majorty opinion2 2 rejected the argument that
Powell's conviction violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The trial
transcript of Powell's conviction offered a better record for review than Budd
although the record was still not as complete as the Supreme Court would have
preferred. The trial court, after hearing the testimony, made certain findings of
fact:
1. That chronic alcoholism is a disease which destroys the afflicted
person's will power to resist the constant, excessive consumption of
alcohol.
2. That a chronic alcoholic does not appear in public by his own
volition but under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic
alcoholism.
3. That Leroy Powell, a defendant herein, is a chronic alcoholic
who is afflicted with the disease of chronic alcoholism.m
19. Id. at 790, 435 P.2d at 696. After hearing testimony that unrelieved and
continuous drunkenness causes death by cirrhosis of the liver, the court stated:
If uninterrupted drunkenness is a direct cause of death, then undeniably
frequent periods of confinement in a clean city jail with nourishing food
during 20 years of chronic addictive alcoholism, were of beneficial
therapeutic effect.
20. Id. at 801, 435 P.2d at 702:
His arguments that there are better ways to handle alcoholics than
methods now employed by the city are undoubtedly sound, but should
be addressed to the legislative and executive branches of government
where the money is raised, appropriated and allocated, personnel engaged
and facilities established to carry out the rehabilitative policies.
21. 85 U.S. 909 (1966).
22. Justice Marshall was joined in this opinion by Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Harlan and Black.
28. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 521 (1968).
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Justice Marshall refused to accept these as findings of fact, saying, "whatever else
may be said of them, those are not 'findings of fact' in any recognizable, traditional sense in which that term has been used in a court of law . ...24 He could
find little basis for these findings in the trial transcript. The only State witness
Was the arresting officer and the only defense witnesses were one policeman who
testified to Powell's arrest record, Powell himself, and one psychiatrist. None of
the testimony given was viewed as sufficiently decisive to support the general
conclusions drawn by the trial judge.
Justice White concurring in the Powell result only, accepted the trial court's
first and third findings but rejected the finding that a chronic alcoholic does not
appear in public by his own volition. If the evidence showed that the specific
defendant was compelled to be in public (i.e., he had no home or became so
drunk that he could not control his actions), and it could be shown that, it was
not feasible for the defendant to have taken precautions which would keep him
out of public places, then Justice White believed it would be a violation of the
eighth amendment to convict him of the crime of public intoxication. 25 Justice
White was, however, unable to discover any evidence that Powell was compelled to
be in public, even though this fact was "found" at the trial.
The dissenting opinion in Powell, written by Justice Fortas, 26 argued that
if the trial judge's first two general conclusions could be validated by outside
authority, his third specific finding that Powell was a chronic alcoholic should be
accepted as conclusive. 27 Justice Fortas believed that the medical profession is in
substantial agreement that alcoholism requires medical treatment and that the
medical profession is in command of sufficient knowledge, if not sufficient
facilities, to treat alcoholics effectively. Numerous medical and sociological authorities are cited by the dissent to support the trial judge's conclusion that
chronic alcoholics are compelled to drink.28 The conclusion that chronic
alcoholics are compelled to be in public is supported specifically only by the
defense testimony at the trial. However, the dissent accepted this conclusion as
unavoidably following from the conclusion that alcoholics are compelled to drink.
In his majority opinion, however, Justice Marshall was able to find no substantial agreement among medical authorities as to the concept of alcoholism.
Marshall relied heavily on a treatise by E. M. Jellinek 29 from which he concluded
that physical withdrawal symptoms might be necessary to show that a person

24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 548-53.
26. Justice Fortas was joined in the dissent by Justices Douglas, Brennan
and Stewart.
27. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 557 n.1 (1968):
I do not suggest in this opinion that Leroy Powell had a constitutional
right, based upon the evidence adduced at his trial, to the findings of fact
that were made by the county court; only that once such findings were in
fact made, it became the duty of the trial court to apply the relevant legal
principles and to declare that appellant's conviction would be constitutionally invalid.
28. Id. at 560-64.
29. E. M. JELLiNEK, THE DxSEASE CONCEPT OF ALcOHOLIsm 11 (1960).
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cannot abstain from drinking. Very few alcoholics display these symptoms. Other
alcoholics have only a "compulsion" or an "exceedingly strong influence" to
drink. Justice Marshall believed that these terms do not have a meaning adequately
defined to form a basis for a rule of constitutional law.
It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol his hands
will begin to shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will
have hallucinations; it is quite another to say that a man has a "compulsion" to take a drink but that he also retains a certain amount of "free
will" with which to resist. It is simply impossible, in the present state of
our knowledge, to ascribe a useful meaning to the latter statement.3 0
Another basic disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Powell
is the feasibility of an alternative to criminal punishment. Justice Marshall
postulated that the intoxicated person could not be left on the street, then studied
the feasibility of civil commitment, and decided that present medical facilities
are far too inadequate to accommodate all alcoholics who would become intoxicated and subject to criminal prosecution.31 "Thus we run the grave risk that
nothing will be accomplished beyond the hanging of a new sign-reading
32
'hospital'-over one wing of the jailhouse."
The dissent countered this argument by citing statistics to show that alcoholics
place a tremendous burden on the criminal process.SS The theory behind these
30. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 526 (1968).
31. Justice Marshall cites some startling statistics in support of his position.
"The lowest current informed estimate places the number of 'alcoholics' in
America . . . at 4,000,000, and most authorities are inclined to put the figure
considerably higher." Id. at 527.
In California, for instance, according to the best estimate available,
providing all problem drinkers with a weekly contact with a psychiatrist
and once-a-month contact with a social worker would require the full
time work of every psychiatrist and every trained social worker in the
United States.
Cooperative Commission on Study of Alcoholism, Alcohol Problems, 120 (1967)
(emphasis in original). Marshall's expectations for the near future are nearly as
bleak as his outlook on the present situation:
Yet the medical profession cannot, and does not, tell us with any assurance
that, even if the buildings, equipment and trained personnel were made
available, it could provide anything more than slightly higher-class jails
for our indigent habitual inebriates.
Powell v. Texas, 892 U.S. 514, 529 (1968).
32. Powell v. Texas, supra note 31, at 529.
33. Some persons have been arrested as often as 40 times during a single
year for public drunkenness and during their lifetime many individuals have
been arrested as many at 125, 150, or 200 times for this offense. Id. at 564. See
F. ALLEN, Tim BORDERLAND OF CRmiuN. Jusnoxm 8 (1964). "Two million arrests
in 1965-one of every three arrests in America-were for the offense of public
drunkenness." Task Force Report: Drunkenness 1 (1967) (published by The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice).
Even as staggering as these statistics may seem, they are mild in relation to
the problems in some urban centers. In Washington, D.C. for example, in 1965,
86,464 arrests were made. Of these, 51.8%/ were for the crime of public drunkenness.
When the related crimes of disorderly conduct and vagrancy are included, the
figure climbs to 76.5%. The same year in Atlanta, 92,965 arrests were made of
which 52.5% were for public drunkenness and 76.61 were for public drunken-
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statistics is that invalidating criminal convictions such as Powell's would reduce
the police work load so much that additional state funds would be available for
treatment facilities. Even if this failed, the "hospital wing" of the jail would be
no worse than the present situation.
Only the concurring opinion of Justice Black questioned the validity of
considering either the availability of treatment facilities or the burdens upon the
criminal process in deciding questions of constitutional law.3 4 Justice Black agreed
substantially with the holding in Seattle v. HilS5 that both distribution of funds
for public alcoholic rehabilitation facilities, and the determination of standards
of criminal liability are basically matters of concern for local legislatures. This
contention was touched only lightly by Justice Marshall and avoided completely
by the dissent.
Perhaps the most important disagreement in Powell concerns the interpreta6
tion of Robinson v. California,3
since the holding in Robinson is applicable to
many "status" or "condition" crimes such as narcotics usage, insanity, homosexuality, and vagrancy. The dissent believed that Robinson held that one could
not be punished for a condition he was powerless to change. While this position
finds little support in the Robinson case itself,37 it does seem to follow logically
from the holding that an addict could not be convicted for the "crime" of being
addicted. Justice White, concurring in Powell, also argued that the status of
being an alcoholic and the act of drinking are as inseparable as the status of
being an addict and the act of using narcotics. He said:

ness, vagrancy or disorderly conduct. However in St. Louis, a city of comparable
size, only 44,701 arrests were made. Of these only 5.5% were for public drunkenness and 18.9% for the related crimes. Evidently this difference is attributable
to different theories of law enforcement. Washington D. C. and Atlanta strictly
enforce their public intoxication statutes while St. Louis is much more lenient.
Since these figures were compiled, St. Louis has taken even further steps to
lessen the burden the alcoholic imposes upon criminal process. A "detoxification center" is now in operation. Intoxicated persons are taken to this center
where, for a few days, they receive a high protein diet, and where Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings, films, group therapy, work projects, lectures, social workers,
etc. are available. However, little rehabilitative care is available to the alcoholic
once he leaves the center.
Philadelphia has a center, much smaller than the one in St. Louis, where
out-patient services such as vocational counseling, including social and occupational skills, and housing relocation are available. When these centers have been
in operation long enough for reliable statistics to be compiled, other cities should
be able to make a more rational decision as to what measures should be taken to
combat the problem of drunkenness. Task Force Report: The Challenge of
Crime 234-37 (1967) (published by The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice): .
34. Justice Harlan joined in this opinion.
35. 72 Wash.2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967).
36. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
37. Id. at 664. "A State might impose criminal sanctions, for example,
against the unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession
of narcotics within its borders." Note, however, that this enumeration does not
include use of narcotics even though such use is one of the acts proscribed by
the California statute.
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Distinguishing between the two crimes is like forbidding criminal
conviction for being sick with the flu or epilepsy but permitting punishment for running a fever or having a convulsion.A
Justice Marshall, on the other hand, does make a distinction between the
crime in Robinson and that in Powell. Since the Texas statute did not seek to
punish Powell for being a chronic alcoholic, "but for being in public while drunk
on a particular occasion . . . for public behavior which may create substantial
health and safety hazards . . ."39 he argued that Powell's conviction does not
fall under the holding in the Robinson case. Justice Marshall would limit the
Robinson case by saying that it stands only for the proposition that a person
must do some act in order to violate a law such as the California narcotics
statute.40 By placing this limitation on the case, Marshall refuses to interpret
Robinson as saying that a person could not be convicted even if this act was involuntary or compelled. Such an interpretation would, in Marshall's view, open
the doors to many questions as to which acts done under "compulsion" or "exceedingly strong influence" could be criminally punished. This, he contends,
would make the Supreme Court "the ultimate arbitrator of the standards of
4
criminal responsibility, in diverse areas of criminal law, throughout the country." 1
The curious result is, then, that while the entire Supreme Court agrees that
the Robinson case is unquestionably good law, there is disagreement as to just
what that law is. The 4-4-1 split among the Powell court gives Justice White's
concurring opinion a great deal of weight. Four justices believe that it was not
shown in this case and cannot presently be shown in general terms that a chronic
alcoholic is compelled to either drink or be in public. Four justices believe that it
can be shown in general, and was shown in this case that chronic alcoholics are
compelled to both drink and be in public. Justice White believes that it can be
shown in general that chronic alcoholics are compelled to drink and accepted the
dissent's view that the Robinson case prevents the alcoholic from being convicted
for such a compulsion. However, Justice White would require that there be evidence, beyond mere "findings" of the trial judge, that the specific alcoholic on
trial was compelled in some way to be in public.
It seems unlikely that Powell is the final word by the Supreme Court either
as to the meaning of Robinson or as to the availability of alcoholism as a defense
to a public intoxication charge. Justice Marshall's opinion makes a long range
challenge to both the medical and legal profession:
It is simply not yet the time to write into the Constitution formulas
cast in terms whose meaning, let alone relevance, are not yet clear either
42
to doctors or to lawyers.
Since five justices substantially agreed upon the dissent's view of the
Robinson case, the Supreme Court may not wish to wait for further medical
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548 (1968).
Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
See note 5 supra.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968).
Id. at 537.
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evidence before re-examining the issues of this case. As has been noted, however,
the major problem in bringing this question before the Supreme Court lies in
obtaining a complete record to review. Since the penalty is usually small, few
cases will arise where a verified chronic alcoholic will obtain a trial broad
enough in scope and complete enough in record to give the Supreme Court the
type of a trial transcript it desires. However, it is likely ihat further interpretations of the Robinson case will be forthcoming, either in the area of chronic
alcoholism or in a related area such as narcotics usage, sexual deviations, or
insanity.
LYND

K. Misc-E

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-IMPLIED
WARRANTIES AND THE NEED FOR A SALE
Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc.1
Mrs. Newmark had no idea of what she was letting herself in for when she
decided to take advantage of a special sale on permanent waves being offered at
the beauty parlor she regularly attended. Immediately after application of the
waving solution, which was administered without following the directions, 2 she
experienced a burning sensation and her scalp turned red. It is not uncommon
for one undergoing this beautifying process to experience these two after-effects,
but here they eventually evolved into something more than merely a passing discomfort. The day after receiving the permanent wave, an unusually large amount
of Mrs. Newmark's hair fell out when combed. Upon visiting a dermatologist
her condition was diagnosed as contact dermatitis. Eventually the redness and
tenderness of the scalp diminished but the loss of hair on the top of Mrs.
Newmark's head persisted at the time of trial.
Mrs. Newmark brought suit against the beauty parlor on two theories:
1. 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968).
2. The directions took the form of a warning telling the operator to "ask
the patron her previous experience with cold waves to be sure she does not have
a sensitivity to waving lotion."
Failure to place this warning on the product as required by the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 361 (1988), would have made the
manufacturer negligent per se. James, Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REv. 44, 212
(1955); Rabbit, Duty to Warn and Adequate Warning in Missouri Products
Liability Cases, 8 ST. L. U.L.J. 407 (1964); Note, 1967 WAsH. U.L.Q. 206.
Failure to conduct a patch test as required by the warning made the beautician negligent. Romero v. And'ra, 216 Cal. App.2d 295, 80 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1968);
Horan v. Klien's-Sheridan, Inc., 62 Ill. App.2d 455, 211 N.E.2d 116 (1965);
Bethancourt v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., 158 So.2d 921 (La.
App. 1968); Wrenn v. Vincent, 285 Md. 466, 201 A.2d 768 (1964); Arnold v. May
Dept. Stores Co., 887 Mo. 727, 85 S.W.2d 748 (1985); Holmes v. Ashford [1950]
2 All Eng. 76 (C.A.).
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negligence, and breach of implied and express warranties. The trial court
refused to allow the warranty theories, ruling that there was no express warranty
and that because the transaction between the parties amounted to the rendition of
services rather than the sale of a product, there could be no implied warranty.
The case was submitted to the jury solely on the issue of negligence. 3 After
the jury returned and the trial court upheld a verdict for the defendant, Mrs.
Newmark appealed, assigning as error the refusal of the trial court to submit the
warranty issues to the jury. Upon appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey held
that implied warranty principles permit recovery against a beauty parlor operator 4 In so holding, the court extended warranty protection in New Jersey to
yet another area where there is no sale of goods.5

3. See W. PROssaR, LAW OF TORTS § 93 (3d ed. 1964), for considerations in
deciding whether to bring an action based on contract or tort.
One should remember that in Missouri the wrongful death action was
created by statute. § 537.000, RSMo 1959. Under this statute a wrongful death
action arises "[w]henever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act,
neglect or default of another .... " With this emphasis on negligence, it is doubtful whether one will have much success in pleading breach of warranty as the
cause of death. Bloss v. Dr. C. R. Woodson Sanitarium Co., 319 Mo. 1061, 5 S.W.2d
367 (1928).
Another factor to be considered is the difference in the statute of limitations.
The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 400.2-725(1), RSMo 1963 Supp., provides for
a maximum four-year statute of limitation, accruing when the breach occurs,
with a provision permitting the parties to reduce the period of limitation to one
year. In comparison, the statute of limitation for a tort cause of action is five
years. § 516.120, RSMo 1959. Krauskopf, Products Liabitily, 32 Mo. L. REv. 459,
459-62 (1967). With these considerations in mind, it is advisable always to plead
negligence, strict tort liability, and warranty.
4. For other beauty parlor cases where the plaintiff was successful, although
not always under a warranty theory, see: Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284,
216 A.2d 189 (1965); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967);
and cases cited note 2 supra.
For unsuccessful attempts to recover, see: Cassina v. Morris M. Taylor &
Sons, Inc., 2 UCC Rep. 1148 (1964); Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Sup. 109,
197 A.2d 342 (1963); Ptomey v. Sayers, (1963-1965) C.C.H. Products Liability
Rptr. § 5305; Quist v. Bressard Distributors, Inc., 24 App. Div.2d 420, 260 N.Y.S.2d
394 (1965); Young v. Clairol, Inc., (1963-1965) C.C.H. Products Liability Rptr.
§ 5168.
5. The New Jersey courts have pursued a liberal policy in applying warranties in areas where an ordinary sale of goods is not present. See: Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), where the court permitted
the child of a purchaser's lessee to recover on an implied warranty theory against
the builder-vendor of a mass housing project. Citing W. PRossER, TORTS § 85 (2d.
ed. 1955) the court said, "[T]here is no visable reason for any distinction between
the liability of one who supplies a chattel and one who erects a structure." Later
in the opinion two factors that the court in Newmark also considered important
were emphasized. First, as with a sale of goods, there was reliance on the skill
and implied representations of the seller. Second, the developer was in a better
economic position to bear the loss than the purchaser or his lessee. Id. 44 N.J. at
91, 207 A.2d at 325-26. Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968),
extended the principles adopted in Schipper to all builders and contractors.
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965), involved
injury suffered by the employee of a lessee caused by a defective chattel (truck)
supplied by the lessor. Here the court saw no good reason for restricting warranties
to sales when the factors giving rise to a warranty situation were present. The
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The basis for the Newmark decision, as well as for other warranty-extending
decisions the New Jersey courts have handed down, is simple, practical, and
logical.6 The underlying premise is that there are certain instances where the
law will imply warranties to protect the consumer irrespective of what classification under which the transaction falls (i.e., sale, service, bailment (lease), construction contract, etc.). 7 The court looked through the labels affixed to the
transaction to the relationship between the parties, 8 and considered the following
factors: (1) reliance of the buyer upon the seller in selecting the source of
supply;9 (2) enterprise liabilitylO-the seller should bear the risk of loss as one
of the costs of doing business; (3) seller's ability to spread the risk of loss because

lessor was in a better position to know and control the condition of the chattel
transferred and to distribute the losses which occurred. The leading decision
on blood transfusions, Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123
N.E.2d 792 (1954), which established that no implied warranties attach to a
transfusion of blood performed in a hospital because the furnishing of blood is
a service and not a sale, was repudiated in Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosptial, 96
N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967). The New Jersey court flatly rejected the
doctrine that a transfusion of blood for a charge is not a sale and went on further
to say that it made no difference whether the transaction was a sale or service if
the basic policy considerations which lead to strict liability are applicable.
6. Implied warranties first developed in the food area. W. PaOSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 97 (3d ed. 1964); 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 242 (3d ed. 1948).
7. The development of this doctrine of applying warranties where they are
needed to protect the consumer can be traced through the following cases: Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which contains a brief historical background of sales transactions; Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963); Santor v. A. & M.
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
After Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, supra, it was clear that warranties
would be implied where courts deemed them needed, but there still remained the
question of the necessity of a sale to someone. This question was answered by
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), in which a
warranty was implied in the home construction area, see note 5 supra, and Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965), which held that
"[t]here is no good reason for restricting such (implied) warranties to sales,"
see note 5, supra. Thus, warranites had evolved to the point where privity and
the sale of goods were no longer needed.
8. Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d
532 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952).
9. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 242b (2d ed. 1924). "The basis of implied warranty is justifiable reliance on the judgment and skill of the warrantor .... " 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAmEs, TORTS § 28.30 (1956). "If reliance upon the seller is
needed, it may be found in the customer's reliance on the retailer's skill and
judgment in selecting his sources of supply;" Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of
Quality in Non.Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. Rxv. 653, 670 (1957).
Reliance is not needed under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A,
Comment m (1965).
10. Relying on Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897 (1963), the court in Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965), defines the purposes of "enterprise liability" as
being
To insure that the cost of injuries or damage ... resulting from defective
products, is borne by the makers of the products who put them in the
channels of trade, rather than by the injured or damaged persons who
ordinarily are powerless to protect themselves.
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of his strategic position in the sales transaction chain; 1 (4) ability to promote
safety on the part of the manufacturer who controls production and on the part
2
of the seller who can use his purchasing power to demand a better product.' If
it is determined that the relationship between the parties, in light of the above
factors, is such that a warranty is needed, one will be implied by the court
regardless of what the parties say' 3 or do. The fact there is a written contract
disclaiming warranties may prove to no avail.14 A combination of modern
marketing practices,' 5 a reduction in the purchaser's bargaining power,16 and the

11. The "risk-spreading" theory is closely akin to the "enterprise liability"
theory. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960), defines the "risk-spreading" argument as being:
The manufacturers, as a group and an industry, should absorb the
inevitable losses which must result in a complex civilization from the
use of their products, because they are in the better position to do so,
and through their prices to pass such losses on to the community at large.
This contention, as Dean Prosser points out, was first given notoriety by Justice
Traynor concurring in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d
436 (1944).
12. R.

DICKERSON,

PRODucTs

LIABILITY AND

THE FOOD

CONSUMER

169-70

(1951); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUm.
L. REv. 653, 670 (1955); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 799 (1966).
13. These implied warranties are not dependent upon the manufacturer's or
retailer's advertising. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207
A.2d 305, 312 (1965).
14. Despite the fact that the parties had executed a written contract by which
the seller had expressly limited its liability to a ninety-day parts replacement warranty, the court, finding this aspect of the contract unconscionable, implied a
warranty of merchantability. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 858,
161 A.2d 69 (1960).
The UNIFoRm ComrrmRcIAr.L CODE § 2-316 (1962) makes provisions for excluding warranties, but a seller cannot go too far without running afoul of § 2-719,
which states that "[]imitation of consequential damages for injuries to the person
in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable . ..."
15. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960),
expressed concern over the marketing device of the "independent dealer," note
7 supra, the form contract, note 14 supra, and the loss of consumer bargaining
power, note 16 infra; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 467, 150
P.2d 436, 443 (1944), noted the changing relationship between buyer and seller.
The consumer no longer has the opportunity or skill to investigate a product. He
trusts the manufacturer and buys according to highly publicized brand names;
Randy Knitwear, Inc., v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 899,
226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962), describes how today's warranty is made through mass
advertising instead of being included as an express term of the sale contract. For
this reason, one cannot adhere to the conventional law of sales and demand privity
before implying a warranty; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, TORTS § 28.33 (1956);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REv. 363, 363-65 (1965); 8 L. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 998A (3d ed.
1964).
16. The loss of consumer bargaining power in our highly industrialized
society was one of the elements making a disclaimer of warranties unconscionable
in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See
note 14 supra.
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of the parties who
are brought together by the play of the market, and who meet each other
on a footing of approximate economic equality . . . But in present-day
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fact that people are becoming more interdependent on one another for goods
and services which they do not have the time, opportunity, or inclination to
inspect before purchase,17 results in an ever increasing variety of transactions
falling under the typical warranty situation. 8 To compensate for this disparity
in economic position between the buyer and seller, courts have used the device
of implied warranty, which permits the consumer to recover damages without
commercial life the standardized mass contract has appeared. It is used
primarily by enterprises with strong bargaining power and position. 'The
weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a
position to shop around for better terms.' Id. at 389, 161 A.2d at
86 (emphasis added).
17. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 311
(1965), recognizes that frequently in today's commercial transaction the "public has
neither adequate knowledge nor sufficient opportunity to determine if articles
bought or used are defective"; King, New Conceptualism of the Uniform Commercial Code: Ethics, Title, and Good Faith Purchase, 11 ST. L. U.L.J. 15, 20
(1966), discussing the time element in contemporary society, facetiously makes
the point that if an attempt were made to understand every form contract signed,
a substantial portion of one's life would be spent pursuing this task rather than
in the use of the articles being purchased.
18. The following types of transactions have given rise to implied warranties. Contract for labor and materials. Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55
Cal.2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1961), implied a warranty of
merchantability to a contract to furnish the necessary labor and material for
constructing a radiant heating system; Kopet v. Klein, 275 Minn. 525, 148 N.W.2d
385 (1967), held that the purchase of an installed water softener gave rise to a
warranty as to the installation as well as to the goods; Burge Ice Machine Co. v.
Weiss, 219 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1955), involving a contract to install refrigeration
equipment for a proposed abattoir and storage plant, implied a warranty of
fitness that a certain volume of beef could be handled; Samuels v. Davis [1943] 2
All E.R. 3 (C.A.), in which the patient of a dentist was permitted to recover on
an implied warranty of merchantability theory for faulty dentures; G. H. Myers
and Co. v. Brent Cross Service Co., 1 K.B. 46, 150 L.T.R. 96 (1933), held that
"[a] repairer of goods, who contracts to do work and labor and supply material
...impliedly warrants that the material supplied shall be reasonably fit for the
purpose... intended ......
Construction contracts. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d
314 (1965); Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968); Baerveldt & Honing
Construction Co. v. Szombathy, 365 Mo. 845, 849, 289 S.W.2d 116, 118 (1956),
"in every contract to perform work there is an implied agreement that the work
will be done in a skillful and workmanlike manner"; Hoye v. Century Builders,
52 Wash.2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958). Implied warranty that a new dwelling
would be fit for human habitation.
Work, labor, and services. (See notes 2 and 4 supra.) Central & South Truck
Lines v. Westfall GMC Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d 841 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958), held
that the doctrine of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 328, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916), extended to persons who repair autos as well as to manufacturers; Connolly
v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 206, 188 A.2d 884, 887 (1963), extended a warranty
of merchantability to "all those who could reasonably be anticipated to use, occupy
or service the operation of the chattel"; Cheshire v. Southhampton Hospital Assn.,
53 Misc.2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1967) (emphasis added), refused- to dismiss
a warranty claim against a hospital since it may be possible to prove a sale somewhere . . .as opposed to an o-verall services contrac.... The court also cited
two cases as representing a minority view that there may be an express warranty
made in the course of performing a contract for services: Napoli v. St.
Peter's Hospital of Brooklyn, 213 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1961), and Payton v. Brooklyn Hospital, 21 App. Div. 898, 252 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1964), dissenting opin-
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regard to the care exercised by the seller.19 It has been said that strict tort liability
is a better term than warranty because of the contractual connotation of the
latter.20 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), which imposes strict
liability on the seller, discards sales concepts2 1 and adopts the "enterprise
ion; Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967),
see note 5 supra. "The transfer of human blood for a consideration is a sale";
Russell v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So.2d 749 (Fla. App. 1966), held that a
cause of action for breach of implied warranty can be maintained against a blood
bank; Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1960), assumed no sale of polio vaccine from doctor to patient but allowed the
initial sale from manufacturer to distributor to permit the patient to maintain an
implied warranty cause of action against the manufacturer; Dodd v. Wilson (1946)
2 All E.R. 691 (K.B.), implied a warranty against a veterinarian who recommended, supplied and administered a certain toxoid to cattle.
Bailment for hire. The following treatises cover the cases adequately: 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMEs, TORTS § 28.19 (1956); 2 R. FRu~MR 8 M. FRIEDMAN, PRODuTs LiABILITY § 19.02(2) (1960); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 98 (3d ed. 1964);
L. VoLD, SALEs § 94 N.42a (2d ed. 1959), covering bailment of containers in food
cases.
Borrower. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961).
Self service stores. James, Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REv. 44, 200 (1955).
Here passage of title seemed to be the main consideration.
19. It is generally agreed that warranty liability is not based on negligence
of the seller. This is clearly consistent with the theory of "enterprise liability,"
note 10 supra. 2 F. HARPER & F. JA~ms, TORTS § 28.15 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS §§ 74, 95 (3d ed. 1964); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry
Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958). Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 858, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
20. Perhaps the most colorful description of warranty can be found in W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 95 (3d ed. 1964). "The seller's warranty is a curious
hybrid, born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the law."
Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. Rr.v. 1, 8 (1888), points out that
warranty liability was originally based on tort and it was not until the late
Eighteenth Century that the first warranty case relying on contract theory was
reported. Gradually warranty came to be looked upon as an implied term of
most contracts. More recently the common law of warranty has been codified,
first by the Uniform Sales Act and then by the UNiFoRM COAZIERCL CODE.
Missouri has enacted the latter. Chapter 400, RSMo 1963 Supp. It is because
the transaction of a sale of goods, with its direct confrontation between buyer
and seller, lent itself so readily to the implying of warranties, that the warranty
law developed primarily in this area. As a result of this sales background, the
courts experienced difficulty when they attempted to abandon such sale concepts
as privity and the necessity for a sale of goods. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, Comment m (1962). In a long line of cases beginning with MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), the privity requirement
was finally discarded. Missouri has discarded the privity requirement. See Roberts,
Implied Warranties-ThePrivity Rule & Strict Liability-The Non-Food Cases, 27
Mo. L. REv. 194 (1962); Lauer, Sales Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 Mo. L. Rev. 259, 277-80 (1965); Krauskopf, Products Liability, 82 Mo.
L. REv. 459 (1967); Krauskopf, Products Liability, 33 Mo. L. REv. 24 (1968).
Although warranty has continued to develop, it is still a complex and confusing area in which courts intermingle contract and tort concepts. L. VOLD, SALES
§ 84 (2d ed. 1959); Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?., I
DUQUESNE L. Rev. 1, 27 (1968); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1126 (1960); Note, 39 NoTRE
DAAiE L. Rev. 680, 681 (1964).
21. Although RESTATEmNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965) speaks in
terms of a sale, it extends coverage to "users" and "consumers". Comment I states
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liability" doctrine. 22 Using this approach, it is immaterial whether a transaction
is a sale or service; 2 3 the important consideration is the economic relationship
24
between the parties.
In the Newmark case, the relationship was ripe for warranty.25 Mrs.
Newmark was a regular customer and the beautician knew the condition of her
hair and scalp. The operator alone selected the waving lotion from sources known
only to him. He alone knew of the special instructions accompanying the product
and, therefore, was in the best position to make certain the lotion was applied
that "[i]t is not even necessary that the consumer have purchased the product at
all." Continuing, Comment 1 gives a broad definition to "consumption" (all ultmate uses for which the product is intended) and then specifically says that a
"customer in a beauty shop to whose hair a permanent wave solution is applied
by the shop is a consumer." (emphasis added)
22. RE-STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965) justifies
strict liability by stating that "public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon
those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained." Compare this language with the "enterprise
liability" doctrine, note 10 supra, and the "risk spreading" doctrine, note 11
supra. Missouri has adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc. 1963).
23. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), speaks in terms of
users and consumers, note 21 supra. Thus, if a person falls into one of the above
categories he may recover regardless of the type of transaction.
The category of "user" has played an important role in extending warranty
protection to service transactions. Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d
189 (1965), permitted the patron of a beauty parlor to recover against the
manufacturer of hair dye. 2 R. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LiABiITr § 19.02
(1960), maintains that the "user" theory as applied in Simpson v. Powered
Products of Mich., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (1963), (a lessorlessee situation) can also be used to allow a beauty parlor patron to recover on
a warranty theory. Hacker v. Rector, 250 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo. 1966), permitted a guest passenger in an automobile to maintain a cause of action based
upon the Restatement's "user" theory. There also have been cases permitting
airline passengers to maintain a warranty action based upon the "user" theory.
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Taylerson v. American Airlines, Inc., 183 F.Supp. 882
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). For a compilation of aviation cases see 8 S.WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 995(a)
(3d ed. 1964).
24. As Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102 NJ. Super, 279, 285, 246 A.2d 11,
14 (1968) points out, "the instances in which implied warranties may be
imposed are not limited to 'sales' that come strictly within the meaning of c2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment
2 (1962) states:
[t~he warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any way to
disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that
warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct
parties to such a contract .... [Ihe matter is left to the case law with
the intention that the policies o this Act may offer useful guidance
in dealing with further cases as they arise.
25. The court cites 2 F. HAR'ER &, F. JAmEs, TORTS § 28.30 (1956), as setting
out the policy reasons for implying a warranty. (I) Reliance upon the sellerreliance is not needed under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
Comment m (1965). (2) "Enterprise liability," see note 10 supra. (3) Seller in a
strategic position to promote safety. (4) Seller known to his customers and sub-
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properly. Finally, the situation was such that the risk of injury should be borne
by the beauty parlor as the price of doing business and because it had the ability to
spread these risks. 26
After expousing this broad policy of applying warranties wherever warranties
are needed without regard to the type of transaction, the court restricted the
scope of the holding by limiting application to cases where a product has been
supplied. 27 It would seem that if one is going to imply warranties according to
the relationship between the parties and not according to the type of transaction,
the fact that goods are supplied should not be controlling. Using the New Jersey
court's approach, warranties should be implied in pure service situations where
the policy consideration supporting a warranty are present. 28 An argument can
be made that warranties are needed even more in pure service areas than in
service combined with goods areas. In the former situation the consumer has
nothing tangible to inspect even if given the opportunity. Perhaps at a future
date when the present line of decisions become more widely accepted the court
will take the next step forward and apply warranties to pure service transactions.
The Missouri courts have been relatively liberal in applying warranties,
recognizing that public policy considerations underlie the warranty area. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co.29 stated that "[r]emedies of injured
ject to their suits. (5) Seller in a good position to pass the loss back to his
supplier-"risk spreading," see -note 11 supra. Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 102
N.J. Super. 279, 287, 246 A.2d 14, 16 (1968).
26. The court has found all five elements required to imply a warranty. See
note 25 supra.
27. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd
sub. nom., 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1967), involved a hypodermic needle
which broke off in the gum of a dental patient. Recovery was denied because the
dentist was not in the business of supplying goods of the particular kind. The
court distinguishes the Newmark case from Magrine v. Krasnica, supra, by emphasizing that, in Magrine, a tool of the dental profession was involved which was
never intended to be supplied whereas in Newmark a product was supplied and
used completely in the process of giving Mrs. Newmark a permanent wave.
Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 287, 246 A.2d 11, 16 (1968).
The UNIFoRM SAT s Aar § 15 (1906), the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-314(1) (1962), and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(a) (1965),
all require that the seller be engaged in the business of selling such products as
the injury producing product. But these provisions are meant to keep a casual
seller from becoming strictly liable and not to grant immunity to persons in the
business of supplying services of the kind that have injured.
28. Most authorities do not go so far as to advocate the application of implied
warranties in pure service situations. Although it is generally recognized that the
same policy considerations are present in service and sales transactions, implied
warranties have not been extended further than transactions involving the
rendering of services where goods are also supplied. 2 R. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRoDucTs LIABILITY § 19.02 (1960); 2 F. HaxER & F. JAMEs, TORTS § 28.30 (1956);
W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 95 (3d ed. 1964); L. VoLD) SA.S § 94 (2d ed. 1959);
4 S. WILLISTON, CONmRACTS § 1041 (rev. 3d. ed. 1936); Farnsworth, Implied
Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 653, 669 (1957).
29. 230 Mo. App. 275, 282-83, 90 S.W.2d 445, 449 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936),
implied a warranty of "fitness for use" in holding the manufacturer liable for
injury sustained by a consumer who drank part of the contents of a bottle of coke
containing a decomposed mouse. See also, Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp.,
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consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of
sales." Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co-30 attempted to break away from the
traditional warranty concepts which were based on the law of sales. Here the
court said, "[T]he administration of justice should not be restricted by a label
attached to the remedy. We should look beyond the procedural form to see the
real nature of the wrong." In Williams v. Ford Motor Go.,31 the practice of basing
liability for defective products either on the principles of negligence or on the
law of sales (privity requirement) was rejected. "Liability is to be measured
by the principles of strict liability for breach of warranty of fitness."32 The court
then proceeded to set out the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) upon

which recovery was based. Thus, if a case similar to Newmark were to arise in
Missouri and the court were persuaded that the situation was ripe for warranty
regardless of the type of transaction, a warranty could be implied based upon
existing Missouri case law.
JOHN C. MONICA

372 S.W.2d 41, 55 (Mo. En Banc. 1963), which adopted the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) and thus extended the doctrine of strict
liability for implied warranty to non-food cases.
30. 241 Mo. App. 1114, 1121, 253 S.W.2d 532, 537 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952)
involved a box of Tide soap powder that was not kind to the consumer's hands
as advertised.
31. 411 S.W.2d 443, 448 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966). The court also recites the
"enterprise liability" doctrine set out in note 10 supra.
32. One should not be misled by this statement which tends to mix pre-code
law, code law, and strict liability into one generalized category. For a discussion of
warranty under early English law and its subsequent development in the United
States see: 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES §§ 195-99 (3d ed. 1948). W. PROSSER, LAM OF
TORTS § 95 (3d ed. 1964) also contains an enlightening discussion of the complexity
of the development of strict liability.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-SENIOR MORTGAGE FORECLOSEDEFFECT ON JUNIOR LEASE
Kage v. 1795 Dunn Road, Inc.'
A deed of trust on the Labor Discount Center had been recorded on December 21, 1962. Plaintiff Kage2 alleged that he leased a portion of the Labor
Discount Center for fifteen years on January 2, 1964, and that on November 4,
1964 the Dunn Road, Inc., acting on behalf of other defendants, foreclosed the
deed of trust to the whole of the property. By affidavit Dunn stated that the
plaintiffs had been permitted to continue to occupy a portion of the building
during the 1964 Christmas season, that on January 19, 1965, a notice of termination was served on Kage, and that the building was closed after February 28,
1965. The plaintiffs alleged that Dunn took title with knowledge of the plaintiffs'
lease and was thereby obligated to continue the lease. Plaintiffs sought both
actual and punitive damages for being locked out of the building. The trial
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.
At the outset the Kage case should be distinguished from the situation where
the lease is superior to the mortgage because it is prior in time or because a
prior mortgage has been subordinated to a subsequent lease. When the lease is
superior, foreclosure of the mortgage does not extinguish or affect the lease, and
the basic problems are to whom the tenant should pay rent and the liability of
the foreclosure sale purchaser as the assignee of the original landlord for the
performance of covenants in the lease. 3
Kage, on the other hand, involves the effect of a mortgage foreclosure sale on
a lease given subsequent to the execution of the mortgage and junior to it. The
case dearly seems to be within the prevailing law both in Missouri and elsewhere in holding that the mortgage foreclosure sale extinguished the lease,
and extinguished all rights and liabilities running between the tenant and
the purchaser. 4 Likewise, the court seems to be in accord with existing law in

1. 428 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. 1968).
2. This case is a consolidation of two cases individually brought against
the defendant by two lessees: Kage and Eberle. Apart from some differences
in the terms of the two leases and the amount of damages requested by the two
plaintiffs, the facts in the cases are virtually identical.
3. G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF MORTGAGES, 347-56 (1951), is
helpful in distinguishing these situations.
4. "Also, like all interests in the mortgaged property attaching to it
subsequent to the mortgage, the lease can be wiped out by foreclosure in all
jurisdictions, title or lien." Id. at 351. The two Missouri cases that the court
cited as illustrative of this proposition were McFarland Real Estate Co. v. Joseph
Gerardi Hotel Co., 202 Mo. 597, 608, 100 S.W. 577, 578 (1907), and Roosevelt
Hotel Corp. v. Williams, 227 Mo. App. 1068, 1066, 56 S.W.2d 801, 802 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1933). In this latter case the court pointed out the basic rationale: "There is
no privity of either estate or contract between the mortgagee and the lessee
of the mortgagor to bind either ..
Roosevelt Hotel Corp. v. Williams,
"
supra at 1066, 56 S.W.2d at 802.
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holding that the oral agreement between Dunn and the plaintiffs, whereby
the plaintiffs were permitted to continue to occupy the premises during the
Christmas season, created at most a month to month tenancy requiring one
month's notice to effect termination. 5 Since defendants' affidavits showed that
timely notice of termination had been given, summary judgment seemingly
was proper.
This note will consider primarily the relationship, if any, arising between
a foreclosure sale purchaser and a tenant under a junior lease and what
notice, if any, is required to terminate this relationship. Following this is a
brief discussion of whether equity under certain conditions will find that
either the purchaser or tenant is bound for the full term of an oral lease.
Preliminarily, where the foreclosure sale purchaser recognizes no rights in the
tenant and accepts no rent but demands that he vacate the premises and, upon
the tenant's refusal starts eviction proceedings the question arises whether the
tenant has any rights other than to harvest growing crops. 6 In the absence of
additional facts giving rise to a month to month or year to year tenancy the
answer clearly seems to be no. The tenant has no right to continue in possession
7
and must vacate the premises on demand by the purchaser.
The primary focus of this note involves the situation where there is a mortgage
foreclosure sale followed by an oral agreement8 between the purchaser and the

5. § 441.060(2), RSMo 1959, reads in part as follows:
All contracts or agreements for the leasing, renting or occupation of
stores, shops, houses, tenements or other buildings in cities, towns or
villages, and of stores, shops, houses, tenements or other buildings except
when such leasing, renting or occupation is as tenant of real estate used
or rented for agricultural purposes, other than garden purposes, not made
in writing, signed by the parties thereto, or their agents, shall be held
and taken to be tenancies from month to month, and all such tenancies
may be terminated by either party thereto, or his agent, giving to the
other party, or his agent, one month's notice, in writing, of his intention
to terminate such tenancy.
6. Upon a mortgage foreclosure sale a tenant shall have the right "to the
growing and unharvested crops . . . to the extent of the interest of the tenant
under the terms of contract or lease between the tenant and the mortgagor or his
personal representatives." § 443.290, RSMo 1965 Supp.
7. See note 4 supra. Missouri has an attornment statute, § 441.150, RSMo
1959, which at first blush might be read to cover the situation where a tenant
tries to attorn to the purchaser following a mortgage foreclosure sale. However,
in Roosevelt Hotel Corp. v. Williams, 227 Mo. App. 1063, 1066, 56 S.W.2d 801, 802
(St. L. Ct. App. 1933) the court stated that the statute is not applicable to this
situation. § 441.150, RSMo 1959 reads:
The attornment of a tenant to a stranger shall be void, and shall
not in anywise affect the possession of his landlord, unless it is made:
(1)With the consent of the landlord; or
(2)Pursuant to or in consequence of a judgment at law, or a decree
inequity, or sale under execution or deed of trust; or
(3)To a mortgagee, after the mortgage has been forfeited.
8. In the case of farm property, this assumes that the duration of the
lease is more than one year from the date of the agreement and hence violative of
the Statute of Frauds. § 432.010, RSMo 1959, in part reads as follows:
No action shall be brought to charge any . . . person . . .upon any
contract made for the sale of lands, tenements, hereditaments, or an in-
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tenant to continue under the terms of the original lease, or under a new set of terms
with a definite termination date.9 If, subsequent to the termination date of the oral
lease, the purchaser brings an eviction proceeding the question arises whether a
month to month or a year to year tenancy was created. If either tenancy is
found to have been created it must also be decided whether the tenant is entitled
to the requisite statutory notice10 before the tenancy can be terminated.
If there is no explicit agreement between the tenant and the purchaser
that the new landlord-tenant relationship should cease at a definite date, the
statutory notice will probably be required. However, such notice of termination
may not be required if the parties have orally agreed that the lease should
terminate at a definite date." The problem in this area is illustrated in
McFarland v. Gerardi Hotel.12 In this case the purchaser at a foreclosure sale
was suing the tenant under a junior lease for unlawful detainer.13 Following
the foreclosure sale on a prior deed of trust there was an oral agreement between
the tenant and the purchaser to continue under the terms of the original lease.
The tenant continued to occupy the premises after the termination date of the
original lease had expired, thus giving rise to the suit. The court found for the
defendant lessee, holding that the foreclosure sale had extinguished all rights
under the original junior lease and that the oral agreement created a month to
month tenancy under section 441.060(2), RSMo 1959, which requires one month's
notice before termination. Since the requisite notice concededly had not been
given, unlawful detainer did not lie.
However, since McFarland was decided, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in
Vanderhoff v. Lawrence,14 has taken a position which arguably casts doubt on
whether McFarland is still good law on the question of notice. In Vanderhoff
there was an oral contract by which the original owners rented the property in
question to defendants on January 24, 1945, for one year starting March 1, 1945.1
terest in or concerning them, or any lease thereof, for a longer time than
one year, or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within one
year from the making thereof, unless the agreement upon which the action
shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith ....
In the case of other property, § 441.060(2), RSMo 1959, note 5 supra, would
convert the oral agreement into a month to month tenancy.
9. Conceivably, this situation may also arise where there is no explicit
agreement but the tenant commences to pay rent to the purchaser which the
purchaser accepts.
10. Sixty days notice is required for a year to year tenancy. § 441.050, RSMo
1959.
11. Vanderhoff v. Lawrence, 206 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. 1947); Russell, Landlord
and Tenant-Periodic Tenancy Arising from Occupancy Under Void LeaseNotice to Terminate, 13 Mo. L. REv. 324 (1948).
12. 202 Mo. 597, 100 S.W. 577 (1907).
13. § 534.080, RSMo 1959.
14. 206 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. 1947); Russell, Landlord and Tenant-Periodic
Tenancy Arising From Occupancy Under Void Lease-Notice to Terminate, 18
Mo. L. Rxv. 824 (1948).
15. Note that the oral agreement was violative of the Statute of Frauds,
note 8 supra. It is the date of the contract that is important in determining whether
the arrangement is for more than one year, not the date of entry upon the
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Defendants entered into possession on February 21, 1945. They refused to
surrender possession on March 1, 1946, because no notice or demand for
possession had been served upon them sixty days before the end of the term
as required by the statute for a tenancy from year to year.10 The trial court
found an unlawful detainer and gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The Kansas
City Court of Appeals, applying section 441.070, RSMo 1959,17 affirmed the trial
court's decision.1S The case was certified to the Missouri Supreme Court because
of a conflict with a principle announced by the Springfield Court of Appeals
in Coleman v. Fletcher,'9 and was affirmed.
Admittedly, there is some difference between the facts in McFarland and
Vanderhoff. McFarland involved the requisite notice to terminate a month to
month tenancy arising from an oral agreement between the lessee and the foreclosure sale purchaser of a prior mortgage. Vanderhoff, however, involved only
the notice due under an oral contract which was invalid because it was not to
be performed within one year. 20 Despite these differences, it is submitted that
since Vanderhoff, McFarland is no longer good law on the question of notice.
Vanderhoff and section 441.070, RSMo 1959, would seem to dictate that a tenancy
from month to month can be terminated without a month's notice if the parties
have agreed on a definite termination date.2 1
Finally, to be discussed briefly is the question of whether equity under
certain conditions will find that the foreclosure sale purchaser or the tenant
under a junior lease becomes bound for the full term of the oral lease. The
Statute of Frauds requires a contract for the conveyance of real estate to be in
writing.22 However, it has long been the rule in Missouri and elsewhere that
equity will afford relief to one seeking to enforce an oral contract to convey
land if he can show part or full performance in reliance upon the contract
and that he has made a material change of position. 23 Likewise, where there is an
performance of the contract. Vanderhoff v. Lawrence, 201 S.W.2d 509, 512 (K. C.
Mo. App. 1947); Womach v. Jenkins, 128 Mo. App. 408, 413, 107 S.W. 423, 425
(K.C. Ct. App. 1908).
16. § 441.050, RSMo 1959. "Either party may terminate a tenancy from
year to year by giving notice, in writing, of his intention to terminate the same,
not less than sixty days next before the end of the year."
17. "No notice to quit shall be necessary from or to a tenant whose term is to
end at a certain time, or when, by special agreement, notice is dispensed with."
18. Vanderhoff v. Lawrence, 201 S.W.2d 509 (K.C. Mo. App. 1947).
19. 238 Mo. App. 813, 822, 188 S.W.2d 959, 963 (Spr. Ct. App. 1945). The
broad principle laid down in this case was that a tenancy from year to year "can be
terminated on the part of the landlord, only, by giving the tenant a written
notice to vacate at least 60 days before the end of the year."
20. See notes 8 and 15 supra.
21. The parties in McFarland had agreed to abide by the terms of the
original lease including the termination date. Though there was some controversy
as to whether this date was January 7 or January 9, it was conceded to be one or
the other, and hence could be considered a definite date after both dates had
passed.
22. See note 8 supra.
23. A fully performed oral contract by one or both of the parties to convey
land is not within the Statute of Frauds. For example, see Bick v. Mueller, 346
Mo. 746, 142 S.W.2d 1021 (1940). This was a suit for specific performance of an
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oral lease, it may be possible to get the lease enforced in equity,2 4 even though in
an action at law the equitable doctrine of part performance alone does not
oral contract to convey real estate made by an elderly man in his lifetime in
consideration for plaintiff's taking care of him for the rest of his life. As there
was evidence that plaintiff had done this, the trial court granted specific performance on the theory that one party's full performance takes an oral contract
out of the Statute of Frauds. The supreme court affirmed. See also Jennings v.
Achuff, 272 S.W.2d 263 (1954). Part performance, likewise, if substantial, by one
of the parties may justify the intervention of equity. For example, in Alonzo v.
Laubert, 418 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1967), there was an oral agreement between plaintiffs and their sister, who was the chief beneficiary under the father's will, whereby
in return for the plaintiffs' not contesting the will the sister was to convey to
each of them a portion of the realty devised to her. In an action for specific
performance of the oral agreement the trial court held that the plaintiffs'
refraining from contesting the will was sufficient part performance to justify
granting specific performance. The supreme court affirmed. See also Jones v.
Linder, 247 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. 1952) (though recognizing that substantial part
performance may take an oral agreement out of the Statute of Frauds, the court
held that there had not been sufficient part performance in this case); Roberts
v. Clevenger, 225 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1950); Hobbs v. Hicks, 320 Mo. 954, 8 S.W.2d
966 (1928).
24. If part performance by one of the parties is very substantial, a court
may grant specific performance as in Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tuckahoe
Mining Co., 202 S.W. 287 (Spr. Ct. App. 1918), where a mining lease was orally
modified, and one party in reliance thereon sank shafts, took out ore, and paid
royalties. The court held that the part performance was sufficient to take the oral
agreement out of the Statute of Frauds.
However, Missouri courts are reluctant to find that there has been sufficient
part performance to take an oral lease out of the Statute. For example, in an unlawful detainer action one court has held that where a person is already in
possession of land under an unexpired prior lease, mere continuance of possession, even if accompanied by plowing and seeding land, is not sufficient part
performance to take an oral agreement extending the lease out of the Statute.
Todd v. Fitzpatrick, 222 S.W. 888 (Spr. Ct. App. 1920). This is probably the
type of situation which § 441.120(1), RSMo 1959 contemplates rather than the
situation in which a tenant holds over following the extinguishment of his junior
lease by a foreclosure sale. It reads as follows:
In all cases where a tenant holds over after the termination of the
time for which the premises were let or leased, under a written contract
between the lessor or his agent and the tenant or his agent, in any suit
for possession by the party entitled to possession of said premises against
such tenant, after the termination of the time for which said premises
were let or leased under written contract, oral evidence shall not be
admissible that said lease or letting was renewed or extended, or that
a new contract was entered into or substituted for the written contract,
but the tenant's right to continued possession or the landlord's right
to collect rent on said premises after the termination thereof, shall be
established by contract in writing; provided, however, this section shall
not prevent a recovery of damages by either party for breach of the
written contract.
In an action at law full performance by one of the parties to an oral lease
takes the lease out of the Statute of Frauds. For example. in Ordeiheide v. Traube,
183 Mo. App. 363, 166 S.W. 1108 (St. L. Ct. App. 1914), plaintiff contracted to
purchase a livery and undertaking business, including the unexpired portion of
a lease extending for more than a year. Defendant was to secure a valid transfer
of the lease to plaintiff. Defendant contended that the written memorandum of
sale was vague regarding the obtaining of the landlord's consent to the assignment
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25
take the oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
In conclusion, if the purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale and the
tenant under the extinguished lease desire to continue under the terms of the
extinguished lease or to form a new lease they should do so in writing, explicitly
enumerating the desired terms. There is a plethora of terms, of course, which
they could include in the written lease. They could adopt the balance of the old
! ase in toto or adopt it with modifications such as a different termination date.
On the other hand, if the purchaser does not want to continue the lease, it
behooves him to notify the tenant to this effect in writing immediately following the foreclosure sale. The trouble arises, as in the Kage case, where the parties
drift along without agreement, or where their explicit agreement is oral.

RIcHARD D. MooRE

of the lease and hence invalid under the Statute of Frauds. The court rejected
this, holding that plaintiff's full performance-going into possession and paying
the total contract price-removed the oral contract from the Statute and entitled
plaintiff to recover damages for defendant's failure to secure the assignment.
See also Lunt v. Biehl, 159 Mo. App. 361, 140 S.W. 757 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911), in
which in an action for rent under an oral lease for more than a year plaintiff was
not barred by the Statute of Frauds because he had fully performed by allowing
defendant to go into possession and remain there for the length of the agreed
term.
25. "This doctrine that part performance will take a case out of the
operation of the statute is purely one in equity, and has no application in a
suit at law." Aylor v. McInturf, 185 Mo. App. 707, 711, 171 S.W. 606, 608 (K.C.

Ct. App. 1914).
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COLLATERAL ATTACK UPON MILITARY
COURTS-MARTIAL IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS
United States v. Augenblickl

Richard Augenblick and Kenneth Juhl, who had been convicted by courtsmartial, brought suits in the United States Court of Claims for back pay.2 Augenblick had been convicted of committing an indecent act and dismissed from
the service, while Juhl had suffered a reduction in rank, partial forfeiture of pay,
and six months confinement for unlawfully selling merchandise from an overseas
Air Force exchange. Having exhausted all other available remedies without
relief,3 each sought to recover back pay from the government, contending that
the courts-martial had been invalid on constitutional or statutory grounds. The
Court of Claims reviewed the military convictions and rendered judgments for
the plaintiffs4 from which the government appealed. The Supreme Court reversed.
Prior to World War II, the authority of federal courts to review both state
and federal criminal convictions and military courts-martial through writs of
habeas corpus was restricted to those cases involving defects in the jurisdiction of
the convicting court. This traditional or narrow concept of jurisdiction was limited
to questions of whether the convicting court was properly constituted, whether it
had jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, and whether it had exceeded
1. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
2. Back pay suits in the Court of Claims are brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(1948), which gives the court jurisdiction over any claims against the United
States based upon its Constitution, laws, regulations, contracts, or tortious acts.
Augenblick's suit was filed October 22, 1964. Juhl's suit was filed October 12, 1965.
3. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 349 n. 1 (1969), states:
Augenblick's conviction was reviewed by a Navy Board of Review
and affirmed, one member dissenting. The Court of Military Appeals
denied a petition for review without opinion January 11, 1963 ....
See 10 U.S.C. § 871.
Juh's conviction was reviewed by the Staff Judge Advocate. The Air
Force Board for Correction of Military Records also denied relief.
4. Augenblick's first contention, which was rejected by the Court of Claims,
stated that he was twice placed in jeopardy when his initial court-martial was
prematurely terminated in favor of a second one. The Court of Claims accepted
his second contention that a violation of the Jenks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1957),
by the court-martial (in not providing for the production of a prosecution
witness's notes and tape recorded statements made during interrogation) was a
denial of the sixth amendment right to a fair trial. Section 3500(b) of the Act,
makes mandatory the production of any statement of a witness which relates to
his testimony. Augenblick v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 131, 377 F.2d 586 (1967),
rev'd, 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
Juhi was granted relief based upon a violation by the court-martial of paragraph 153(a) of the Manual for Courts-Martial (prescribed by the President
pursuant to the UNIFORM CODE OF MiLrr..Y JUsTICE, art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836
(1956), which prohibits conviction "based upon the uncorroborated testimony of
a purported accomplice in any case, if such testimony is self-contradictory, uncertain, or improbable." The testimony of one Hughes, an accomplice of Juhl,
was accepted in violation of the above provision. Juhl v. United States, 181 Ct.
Cl. 210, 383 F.2d 1009 (1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
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its authorized power. 5 Although some review was allowed in rare cases,6 persons
were usually unable to attack collaterally alleged constitutional defects in their
trials and resulting convictions. Errors in trial court procedure resulting in
deprivation of one's constitutional rights7 were held not to deprive the convicting
courts of the necessary jurisdiction. 8 Beginning with the Supreme Court's 1938
decision in Johnson v. Zerbst,9 the jurisdiction of federal courts to review both
federal and state convictions has been greatly expanded.3O No longer need the
reviewing court find a defect in the trial court's jurisdiction in the narrow sense;
an allegation of infringement of one's constitutional rights is sufficient to allow
review. 1 The military, however, has not felt the impact of this expansion in
habeas corpus review.12 While the federal courts, in spite of a Congressional enact-

5. This scope of review was applied to military convictions. See, e.g., Collins
v. McDonald, 258 U.S. 416 (1922); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902);
Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496, 498 (1900); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
For cases applyng the standard to collateral review of civilian convictions, see,
e.g., In re Gregory, 219 U.S. 210 (1911), Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442 (1910);
In re Moran, 203 U.S. 96 (1906); Dimmick v. Tompkins, 194 U.S. 540 (1904);
Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 138 (1901). For a thorough discussion of these
grounds see Fratcher, Review by Civil Courts of Judgments of Federal Military
Tribunals, 10 OHio S.L.J. 271 (1949).
6. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327, 830-331 (1915), indicated that an
extreme violation of due process may allow the court to look further than just the
trial court's jurisdiction and into the substance of the trial record. The case stated
that the trial court's jurisdiction may be lost "in the course of the proceedings."
Id. at 327. In Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 116 (1895), the court considered
briefly the record as it related to a possible violation of the eighth amendment.
See also Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
7. If a state conviction is involved, the allegations arise from the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment; if a federal court, from the fourth,
fifth, sixth, or eighth amendments.
8. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890) states:
[I]t is .equally clear that by habeas corpus the civil courts exercise no
supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court-martial;
and that no mere errors in their proceedings are open to consideration.
9. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
10. Beginning with Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466, 468, (1938), which
held that an infringement of one's constitutional rights in federal court allowed
the federal courts the jurisdiction to review the subject matter in order to discover
whether such an infringement had caused the convicting court to lose the
necessary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has developed this review in subsequent
cases: Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), holding that deprivation of
constitutional rights in trial procedure, as well as jurisdictional defects, represented a separate ground for review by federal courts; House v. Mayo, 324 U.S.
42 (1945), extending the reasoning of Johnson v. Zerbst and Waley v. Johnston
to violations of due process in state court convictions; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), requiring only the allegation of infringement of one's constitutional
rights to obtain review and defining clearly the scope and procedure involved
in such review.
11. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
12. Following the decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, a number of federal courts
applied the reasoning in that case to review of military courts-martial and thus
began to allow expanded review in the military area. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Brown, 175
F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339 U.S. 103 (1950); Montalvo v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d
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ment providing that the findings of military tribunals are final and binding on
the reviewing courts,13 have recognized habeas corpus in military cases,14 the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to expand this jurisdiction to the same
extent it has in the civilian area.
Not until Burns v. Wilson,'5 decided in 1953, was the Court willing to indicate that the scope of review was any broader than review of the convicting
court's jurisdiction.16 Although it failed to apply the broad standard of Johnson
v. Zerbst to military habeas corpus, the Supreme Court in Burns nevertheless
appeared to broaden the scope of review. Speaking for four members of a
divided Court, Chief Justice Vinson set forth the following criteria:
[W]hen a military decision dealt fully and fairly with an allegation
raised ... it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply
17
to re-evaluate the evidence.
It is the limited function of the civil courts to determine whether
the military have given fair consideration to each of these claims.' 8
Justice Frankfurter, who neither dissented nor concurred in the original opinion,
subsequently urged the Court to rehear the case and to consider fully the jurisdictional problem raised in the light of Johnson v. Zerbst, but the Court refused.' 9
The result was the introduction of a standard somewhat more liberal than the
requirement that jurisdiction in the narrow sense be defective before the court

645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 874 (1949); Smith v. Hiatt, 170 F.2d 61 (3d
Cir. 1948), rev'd, Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949); Benjamin v. Hunter,
169 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1948); Wrublewski v. McInerney, 166 F.2d 243 (9th Cir.
1948); United States ex rel. Weintraub v. Swenson, 165 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1948);
United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944); Schita v. King, 138
F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943). The Supreme Court, however, did not accept this broad
view of jurisdiction but adopted the narrow "jurisdictional" concept for determining the scope of review in military cases. Hiatt v. Brown, 389 U.S. 108, 111
(1950); Humphrey v. Smith, 36 U.S. 695 (1949). See also In re Yamashita, 327
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1946).
18. UNIFOR,.M CODE OF MILITARY JusTIcE, art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1956),
provides:
The appellate review of records of trial provided by this chapter, the
proceedings, findings, and sentences of courts-martial as approved, reviewed, or affirmed as required by this chapter . . . are final and conclusive.... [A]ll action taken pursuant to those proceedings are binding
upon all ... courts ... of the United States.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 349 (1969); Burns v.
Wilson, 846 U.S. 137, 142 (1953); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 180 (1950).
The last case interprets article 58 of the ARsaTm oF WAn, Act of June 24, 1948,
ch. 625, § 280, 62 Stat. 639.
15. Burns v. Wilson, 846 U.S. 137 (1953).
16. In Hiatt v. Brown, 389 U.S. 103 (1950), the Supreme Court adopted the
same test used in all habeas corpus cases decided before Johnson v. Zerbst. The
only test was that of "jurisdiction." Id. at 111.
17. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142 (1953).
18. Id. at 144.
19. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 846 U.S. 844 (1953).
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would review, but falling short of the liberal scope of collateral review found in
the non-military area.20
The above standard, set forth by less than a majority of the Court, is
inadequate. Although it is a clear indication of a desire within the Court to
liberalize the scope of review, 2 1 it has brought a confused response from the lower
courts. 22 While some courts take a liberal view of Burns and weigh the allegations
of infringement upon constitutional rights, 23 most courts are content to deny
jurisdiction either on the ground that the court-martial had adequate jurisdiction
or that the contentions of the petitioners had been fully and fairly considered by
20. Although several varying interpretations of the meaning of this standard
are possible, it is fairly clear that there was an intent upon the part of the Court
to broaden the scope of review. While the review is not as broad in the military
area as it is in the civilian, it is not restricted merely to jurisdictional questions.
Rather, the reviewing court is apparently allowed to review the military court's
action to see if the constitutional allegations have been given proper consideration.
The confusion arises when one attempts to determine what constitutes lack of a
"fair consideration" by the military or failure of the military court system to deal
"fully and fairly" with these allegations. Is the civilian court allowed to review
the record only if no consideration was given by the military courts to constitutional allegations? Or, is the court allowed to go further in reviewing the military's
treatment of these allegations? If the federal court can go further, how close may
this scope of review approach the standard set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst?
21. In addition to the four justices joining Chief Justice Vinson in the
plurality opinion and the one justice concurring in the result, Justices Black and
Douglas, dissenting, and Justice Frankfurter, neither concurring nor dissenting,
indicated that collateral review of military cases should not be construed only
to include questions of jurisdiction. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 149, 152-155
(1953). Only Justice Minton felt that review should not exceed the traditional
jurisdictional bounds. Id. at 146.
22. It has been suggested that post-Burns lower court cases fall into four
categories: (1) courts which, after reviewing the facts and allegations, find petitioners' allegations insufficient to raise constitutional defects no matter how
liberal the scope of review might be; (2) courts which attempt to rationalize Hiatt
v. Brown and Burns v. Wilson by stating (apparently in contradiction) that the
civilian courts are unable to extend review to constitutional allegations, and then
that these same allegations are insufficient to demonstrate any denial of due
process; (3) courts (constituting a majority of the lower courts) which flatly refuse
to look at constitutional allegations raised by petitioners because of lack of
jurisdiction in the convicting court; and (4) courts which go beyond a narrow
scope of review and make their own determinations as to the validity of constitutional allegations despite considerations by the military establishment. Katz and
Nelson, The Need for Clarification in Military Habeas Corpus, 27 OHIo ST. L.J.
193, 206-211 (1961). Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral
Review of Court-Martial Convictions, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 40, 60 (1961), on the
other hand, states that the "reported opinions of the lower federal courts . . . do
not lend themselves to facile taxonomy."
23. E.g., Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1967);
Swisher v. United States, 354 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1966); Gibbs v. Blackwell, 354
F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1966); White v. Humphrey, 212 F.2d 503 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954); In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965);
U.S. ex rel. Atkinson v. Kish, 176 F. Supp. 820 (M.D. Pa. 1959). Although all of
the above cases employed some form of an independent determination of due
process, each case, with the exception of In re Stapley, used language in the
opinions indicating that the scope of review was narrower in military than in
c=vilian cases. Also, these courts were careful to frame their opinions in terms of
existing standards.
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the military appellate system. 24 Even those courts that do weigh the constitutional
objections and seem to indicate a willingness to expand review beyond a narrow
interpretation of Burns, have repeatedly found that none of the petitioners'
constitutional rights were infringed. As a result of these positions taken by the
federal courts, habeas corpus relief has been almost non-existent for military
convictions. 25
Another type of collateral remedy, in which the petitioner seeks nullification
of his conviction following imprisonment, has recently met with more success.
Both the First2 6 and Tenth 27 Circuits have allowed an action in the nature of
mandamus compelling the Secretary of Defense to change records of petitioners
from dishonorable to honorable discharges. 28 Both of these courts have taken a
most liberal view of Burns v. Wilson in allowing review of courts-martial based
upon allegations of infringement of constitutional rights. 2 9 Not only did they allow
relief under a broad concept of collateral review, but they asserted that the

24. E.g., United States ex tel. Thompson v. Parker, 399 F.2d 774 (3d Cir.
1968); Puhl v. United States, 376 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 1967); Palomera v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 946 (1966); Crigler v. United
States Army, 285 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1961); Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365 (9th
Cir. 1955); Bouchries v. Van Matre, 223 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Easley v.
Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. O'Callahan v.
Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966); Dennis v. Taylor, 150 F. Supp. 597
(M.D. Pa. 1957); Bokoros v. Kearney, 144 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Tex. 1956).
25. In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (1965). This is the only instance in
which a federal district court has ordered the release of a military prisoner on a
writ of habeas corpus. The district court found that the federal courts should
be allowed jurisdiction to review and grant relief where the court-martial has
denied one's constitutional rights. Unlike other courts which have suggested expanded review and then denied relief on other grounds, the court here found
that the court-martial had not met the constitutional requirements of the fifth
and sixth amendments. The possible implications of this case were not realized,
nor was the case allowed to gain any precedential value because of the government's failure to take an appeal. See also Gibbs v. Blackwell, 354 F.2d 469 (5th
Cir. 1965), in which the court cited In re Stapley and remanded a lower court's
dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus for further consideration.
26. Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965).
27. Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1968).
28. Mandamus was granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1962), which allows
the district courts original jurisdiction in mandamus actions against government
officials, to compel the Secretary of Defense to act pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552
(1956). Section 1552 (a) provides that "the Secretary of a military department,
under procedures established by him and approved by the Secretary of Defense,
. . may correct any military record . . . when he considers [it] necessary to

correct an error or remove an injustice."
In at least one case, an injunction has been sought following conviction,
but prior to imprisonment, to compel the United States Court of Military Appeals to review petitioner's conviction. The injunction was denied; Gallagher v.
Quinn, 363 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966).
29. Both courts indicated that even if these constitutional allegations had
been reviewed by the military authorities, it was not a bar to a consideration
of them by the federal courts. Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896, 899 (10th Cir.
1968); Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277, 279 (1st Cir. 1965). This is a position
quite similar, if not identical, to Johnson v. Zerbst. Both courts appear to suggest that the liberal view of jurisdiction in civilian cases is applicable to military
courts-martial.
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exceptions to the finality provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 87630 are not limited to
habeas corpus. 3 ' But more significantly, unlike the result in those courts which
had construed Burns liberally in habeas corpus situations, petitioners were
32
successful in obtaining the desired relief.
By far the most prevalent collateral attack on courts-martial following imprisonment 33 has been the Court of Claims suit for back pay of the type brought
by Augenblick and Juhl.3 4 Although the Supreme Court has recognized such a
remedy, the jurisdiction of the federal courts in such cases was construed to
include only those instances where the courts-martial lacked jurisdiction in
the narrow sense. 35 However, in Shapiro v. United States,3 6 while couching
its language in narrow terms, the Court of Claims extended review to a situation
where the petitioner's right to counsel had been flagrantly violated.37 The court
considered that such a deprivation, as evidenced upon the record, rendered the
determination of the court-martial void.38

§ 876 (1956).
31. Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896, 899 (10th Cir. 1968). See also Gusik v.
Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 133 n. 3 (1950).
32. The existence of a broader scope of review with this remedy as compared
to that allowed in habeas corpus actions, presents a paradox. While it would
seem that ar individual in confinement as the result of a constitutionally defective court-martial would be suffering a greater disability than one whose record has
been tarnished by the same type of procedure, the latter individual is apparently
afforded a broader scope of review than the prisoner. This situation is just the reverse in the civilian area where the prisoner is allowed a broad scope of review,
but once he is released, his chances for relief are slight, if not non-existent. Although the Supreme Court in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), has
granted habeas corpus relief to a state parolee, there appears to be no remedy
available beyond those situations where the individual is characterized as in
custody.
33. The Supreme Court in United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 349
(1969), suggested the possibility of back pay relief in suits not exceeding $10,000
under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)(1940).
34. The suit was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1948), discussed in note
30. UNIFORf CODE OF MILITARY JusTICE, art. 76, 10 U.S.C.

2 supra.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 206 U.S. 240 (1907); Swaim v. United
States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887); Keyes
v. United States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883); Dynes v. Hoover, 62 U.S. (20 How.) 65

(1857).
36. 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947).
37. Petitioner had been arrested under an artide of war for having delayed
a court-martial during his defense of a soldier charged with rape. He was arrested
at 12:40 p.m., brought to trial at a location 35 to 40 miles from the place of his
arrest at 2:00 p.m., and convicted at 5:80 p.m. This was carried out despite the
petitioner's request for a continuance in order to secure counsel. Shapiro v. United
States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 652-653, 69 F. Supp. 205, 206 (1947). The court stated,
"that a more flagrant case of military despotism would be hard to imagine." Id.
at 653, 69 F. Supp. at 207.
38. In reaching this decision, the court cited Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
468 (1938), and indicated that this infringement upon constitutional rights would
cause the court-marital to lose jurisdiction during the course of the proceedings;
Shapiro v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 654-655, 69 F. Supp. 205, 207-208.
The implication of this reasoning would be to allow the Court of Claims review in
back pay suits much similar to that allowed in the civilian area of habeas corpus.
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In the 1950's, the Court of Claims appeared to retreat from its position in
Shapiro by denying relief in every such suit for back pay.3 9 However, in spite of
the narrowness of that court's language in interpreting jurisdiction prior to
Burns v. Wilson,40 and its apparent adoption of the Burns test after 1953,41 the
court consistently reviewed the records of courts-martial to determine the validity
of the claimants' constitutional allegations.4 2 The court seemed to take the position
that at least where the denial of one's constitutional rights had been substantial,
43
the court would be supplied with the proper jurisdiction to review the case
44
Then, in Shaw v. United States, decided in 1966, the Court of Claims not
only allowed plaintiff to recover back pay but suggested a scope of review consistent with that enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst. The Court stated:
[W]e think abstenence from review of military convictions is not to be
practiced where the serviceman presents pure issues of constitutional law,
unentangled with an appraisal of a specific set of facts. That type of
unmixed legal question this court has always decided for itself.4 5
A year later, this court in Augenblick v. United States,46 again suggested that
review of military convictions be on a par with the review of civilian decisions

39. Narum v. United States, 151 Ct. C1. 312, 287 F.2d 897 (1960), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 848 (1961); Belgalke v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 397, 286
F.2d 606, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 865 (1960); Griffiths v. United States, 145 Ct.
Cl. 669, 172 F. Supp. 691, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 865 (1959); Krivoski v. Unted
States, 136 Ct. Cl. 451, 145 F. Supp. 239, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 954 (1956); Graham v.
United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 324, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 917 (1956); Lucas v. United
States, 121 Ct. Cl. 819 (1952); Fly v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 482, 100 F.
Supp. 440 (1951); Sima v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 405, 96 F. Supp. 932 (1951).
40. Fly v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 482, 496, 100 F. Supp. 440, 441 (1951),
states: "The law is well settled that this court, regardless of error of law committed,
cannot grant relief from the consequences of his court-martial sentence if the
court-marital had jurisdiction in the case." Sima v. United States, 119 Ct. C.
405, 425, 96 F. Supp. 932, 937 (1951), states: "The general court-marital, it must
be concluded, had jurisdiction of plaintiff and of the offense with which he was
charged. Its proceedings and sentence are not open to review or collateral attack
in any civil tribunal."
41. Belgalke v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 397, 401, 403, 286 F.2d 606, 608,
610, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 365 (1960).
42. In Griffiths v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 669, 673, 172 F. Supp. 691, 693,
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 865 (1959), the court states: "Therefore, it is necessary
to consider whether the action of the court-martial . . . had the effect of
depriving the plaintiff of his rights under the Constitution to the assistance of
counsel for his defense." In Sima v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 405, 426, 96 F.
Supp. 932, 938 (1951), the court states, "From the entire record in this case,
we cannot say that plaintiff was deprived of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments ..
"
43. See, e.g., Narure v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 312, 322, 287 F.2d 897,
902 (1960), ceY-t. denied, 368 U.S. 848 (1961); Griffiths v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl.
669, 677-678, 172 F. Supp. 691, 696, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 865 (1959); Fly v.
United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 482, 498, 100 F. Supp. 440, 442 (1951).
44. 174 Ct. C1. 899, 357 F.2d 949 (1966).
45. Shaw v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 899, 905, 357 F.2d 949, 954 (1966).
46. 180 Ct. Cl. 131, 377 F.2d 586 (1967).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss4/7

38

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

et al.: Recent Cases

[Vol. 34

found in Johnson v. Zerbst.4 7 In Juhl v. United States,48 which did not deal
directly with the allegations of infringement upon constitutional rights, the Court
of Claims asserted in dictum the same liberal view of jurisdiction as it had in
49
Augenblick v. United States.
The Supreme Court was faced in Augenblick and Juhl with the same issue
that had confronted them in Burns v. Wilson: whether the scope of review of
courts-martial convictions should be expanded in collateral actions to the same
extent as collateral review of civilian convictions. In other words, since no direct
appellate review of military courts-martial is available in the federal court system,
should these federal courts now be allowed to review constitutional allegations in
military convictions through such collateral remedies as mandamus, habeas corpus,
and suits for back pay? The Supreme Court, however, refused to deal with this
question.50 Rather, it assumed arguendo the more liberal positions of jurisdiction
taken in the Court of Claims and reversed on the ground that the alleged errors
in the two courts-martial did not rise to the level of constitutional defects.51 Thus,
47. The court cites the expanded jurisdiction concept found in Johnson
v. Zerbst and then claims that the Court of Claims has kept pace with this development. In addition, the court contends that this broadened concept of jurisdiction as applied to the military, has found recognition from the Supreme Court
by citing Justice Frankfurter's opinion urging unsuccessfully that the Court
grant a rehearing in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, rehearing denied, 346 U.S.
844, 847-848 (1953). Augenblick v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 131, 140-144, 377
F.2d 586, 593 (1967).
48. 181 Ct. Cl. 210, 383 F.2d 1009 (1967).
49. The Court of Claims based its decision on the fact that the compliance
by the court-martial with a rule of procedure violated by the convicting authority
was essential to the power of the court-martial to decide the case. See note 4
supra. Failure of the military tribunal to so comply would and did result in the
loss of jurisdiction allowing review by the Court of Claims. While concluding in
dictum that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction to weigh allegations of constitutional infringement, the court felt that failure of the court-martial to follow
the rule in question was an even stronger ground for collateral review. Juhl
v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 210, 228-235, 383 F.2d 1009, 1019-1023 (1967). The
Supreme Court, however, did not discuss this question and reversed on the grounds
that the violation found by the Court of Claims was not substantial enough to
warrant an infringement on constitutional rights; United States v. Augenblick,
393 U.S. 348, 351-352 (1969).
50. In addition, the Supreme Court did not decide the question of whether
the exceptions to finalty clause of the UNIFORM CODE OF MILrrARY JUsTIcE, art. 76,
10 U.S.C. § 876 (1956), (see note 13 supra) were limited to habeas corpus.
United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 351-352 (1969).
51. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 351-352 (1969).
Noting that the Supreme Court has abstained from deciding the question of
the scope of the Court of Claims' jurisdiction to review decisions of courts-martial,
the Court of Claims in a case subsequent to Augenblick has found that a naval
officer had been illegally discharged after a constitutionally defective courtmartial and was entitled to back pay. Apparently the Court of Claims reasoned
that since the Supreme Court in Augenb lick had only held that the allegations
of respondents did not reach constitutional proportions, the fact that plaintiff's
claim here did involve a clear infringement of constitutional rights gave the
court jurisdiction. Gearinger v. U.S., 38 U.S.L.W. 2093, - F.2d (Ct. Cl. 1969).
(Officer Gearinger had been "convicted of 'fail[ing] safely to keep' Navy funds
on the basis of his presumed guilt of negligence or fault in the absence of an
affirmative demonstration by him that some other person or occurrence (e.g., fire)
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although the Court has felt little reluctance to expand and define dearly the
scope of collateral review of state court convictions, it is apparently unwilling to
do so in the realm of military courts-martial.
Perhaps the most substantial argument against expanding the scope of
review in military courts-martial stems from the recognition that military and
civilian systems of justice are noticeably different in orientation and purpose.
This difference is reflected by the fact that the primary purpose of military justice
is to compel affirmative action such as incurring the risk of imminent death,
whereas civilian criminal justice is designed almost wholly to deter reprehensible
conduct.52 Moreover, since the Constitution empowers Congress to create the
military, 53 the military arguably should be a separate creature subject only to
those regulations which Congress formulates.54 It has been contended that this
separateness and the need of the military, especially in times of national
emergency, to maintain good order and discipline require the segregation of a
system of jurisprudence controlled almost exclusively within the military establishment.55 Accordingly, if the scope of civilian review were expanded beyond
that already allowed by Congress through the Court of Military Appeals or by the
present limited collateral review, the result could well be a transposition of the
concept of civilian due process upon military courts-martial, followed by a breakdown in military discipline. 56 Moreover, even if federal courts were to attempt
to formulate a different standard for military due process, such an attempt
arguably would result in an unwanted intrusion of civilian supervision into vital
military affairs. Finally, because substantial procedural advances have been made
within the military system of justice,57 there is some merit to the contention
caused the loss .. " Based upon the Supreme Court's holdings in Tot v. U.S.,
319 U.S. 468 (1943), and U.S. v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), the Court of Claims
found that there was insufficient connection between the presumed fact and the
proven fact and therefore the presumption of loss through Gearinger's negligence
or fault was unconstitutional.)
52. See, Fratcher, PresidentialPower to Regulate Military Justice: A Critical
Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 861,
868-869 (1959).
58. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. For a full discussion of this argument, see W.
AYcocK and S. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JusncE 196-207 (1955).
54. W. AycocK and S. WuRFEL, supra note 58, at 878; G. GLENN and A.
ScHILLER, Tin ARmy AND TnE LAw 8 (1943).
55. W. AYcocK and S. WuRFEL, supra note 58, at 871, states, "To those
in the military or naval service of the United States the military law is due
process." See also G. GLENN and A. ScHiLLER, supra note 53, at 54-85.
56. Ibid.
57. In addition to the right to petition the Court of Military Appeals, which
is a civilian review court. THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, 10 U.S.C. §§
801-940 (1956), provides for substantial procedural safeguards prior, during,
and after court-martial proceedings. The Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-682, 82 Stat. 1385 (Oct. 24, 1968), in addition to further procedural
safeguards, allows the accused professional counsel in situations where he did
not previously have a right to counsel.
Labar, The Military Criminal Law System, 50 A B.A.J. 1069 (1964), asserts
that "in all stages of the procedure the military accused enjoys greater protection
of his rights .. " See also Shields, A Supplement to the Survey of Military Justice,
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that further interference by civilian courts in protecting the soldier's constitutional rights is unwarranted.68
On the other hand, the peculiar military aloofness from civilian affairs no
longer seems to be the case today because military affairs are closely integrated
into our society. Moreover, even if a distinction between military and civilian
jurisprudence is conceded, the need for a narrower scope of review in habeas
corpus attacks of courts-martial is not logically required. Although a distinction
is recognized today between state and federal criminal convictions, 59 neither
that distinction nor the increased federal habeas corpus case load involving state
court convictions has prevented the Supreme Court from allowing full determina60
tion of constitutional issues through collateral attack on these state convictions.
Rather, the Supreme Court has been able to recognize and evaluate carefully the
Constitution as it applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 31 Although the relationship of the federal court system
to state courts is not completely analogous to that between federal and military
courts, 02 the apparent fear of complete injection of civilian due process into the
military system seems ill founded. Expanded review standing alone should not be
equated with the creation of a civilian standard of due process in an area where
such a standard would not always be feasible.63 Consequently, there is no reason
why federal courts could not formulate an acceptable standard of due process for
those military situations where such a distinction is necessary. Where the matter
is peculiar or necessary to successful military operations, the courts could and
should apply a varying standard.
While the task of formulating such a standard in necessary cases would
be substantial, the federal courts have not neglected such a task where "state"

41 MIL. L. REv. 109 (1968); Court of Military Appeals and The Bill of Rights: A
New Look, 36 GEO. WAsH. L. Rxv. 435 (1967). For an historical view of this area
see W. AYCoCK and S. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UmFORm CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE (1955); Fratcher, Appellate Review in American Military Law,
14 Mo. L. REv. 15 (1949).
58. These arguments against substantial expansion of the scope of review
of military courts-martial are essentially the ones set forth in Chief Justice Vinson's plurality opinion in Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140-142 (1953). See also
Hiatt v. Brown 339 U.S. 103 (1950); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
59. Chief Justice Vinson states in Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953),
"Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and distinct from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment."
60. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
61. E.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), right to speedy
trial; Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), exclusion of evidence of prior convictions; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), right to confrontation with adverse
witnesses; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), freedom from self-incrimination;
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), right to counsel; Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.
62. A primary distinction is the fact that, unlike state court decisions, there
is no appeal to the Supreme Court in military cases. The Court of Military
Appeals is the court of last resort in military courts-martial.
63. See Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 11, 72 HAuv. L. REv. 266, 303 (1958).
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due process was concerned. There has already been judicial rcognition by federal
courts of the existence of a separate concept of due process applicable to the
military. The Court of Claims and those circuit courts taking a liberal view of
the federal scope of review in this area have been able to weigh constitutional
allegations as they relate particularly to the military.6 4 The consideration by the
Supreme Court of the constitutional allegations in the present case, after assuming
broad jurisdiction arguendo, offers additional evidence of the feasibility of
formulating a standard for military due process.65 Furthermore, any difficulty in
establishing such a standard appears to be lessened when one realizes that
66
certain guidelines are already in existence in the civilian area. Since an overwhelming majority of the cases considered in these collateral attacks of military
convictions are also violations of civilian criminal statutes, the problem areas
6
involved will not be entirely new to the federal courts. 7
Even if the standard of due process which the federal courts might adopt
were much narrower than that found in civilian cases, the soldier would still be
in a much better position than at present. There seems little reason why a prisoner
should be confronted with an additional hurdle of narrow jurisdiction just because
he wears a uniform.68 Even though the military judicial system finds its origin
through Congressional enactment, this should not place the soldier at a disadvantage in obtaining review of possible infringements of his constitutional rights.
This does not suggest that military courts-martial are inherently unfair or their
procedures unconstitutional. Rather, it suggests that in a system of judicial review
headed by a single Supreme Court, that Court should make all final determinations as to rights arising under the Constitution. Such determinations are required
whether these constitutional rights are violated by military or civilian authorities.
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Augenblich adds little
clarification to the question of collateral review of military courts-martial. The
decision leaves intact both the narrow and the broad interpretations of the scope
of collateral review which have been adopted by different federal courts since
64. Justice Frankfurter recognizes this distinction in Burns v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137, 149 (1953). Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944), states:
We think that this basic guarantee of fairness afforded by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment applies to a defendant in criminal
proceedings in a federal military court as well as in a federal civil
court....
This is not to say that members of the military forces are entitled to
the procedure guaranteed by the Constitution to defendants in the civil
courts. As to them due process of law means the application of procedure
of military law.
See also Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 352 (1952), dissenting opinion.
65. Although these courts have denied relief in the past (until the more
recent decisions in the Court of Claims), they have weighed allegations of
infringement upon constitutional rights as they applied to the military.
66. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 351-356 (1969).
67. Katz and Nelson, The Need for Clarification in Military Habeas Corpus,
27 OHIo S. L. R.xv. 193, 216 (1966).
68. See Katz and Nelson, The Need for Clarification in Military Habeas
Corpus, 27 OHIo S. L. Rv. 193, 216-218 (1966).
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Burns v. Wilson.69 The majority of the courts, which have interpreted Burns
more narrowly, should find no cause for expansion of review since Augenblick
offers little reason for overturning sixteen years of established precedent within
these circuits. On the other hand, those more liberal courts which appear to apply
a Zerbst concept of jurisdiction to attacks upon military convictions will not be
discouraged from their liberal interpretations since the Supreme Court did not
reject this position. If anything, these courts may now be more inclined to grant
relief because, unlike Burns (in which the Court reversed on jurisdictional
grounds), the Supreme Court in Augenblick was willing to use an expanded concept of jurisdiction at least for argumentative purposes.70
This decision not only perpetuates the confusion in this area but continues
to deny to an individual, because he is in uniform, review which is logically and
justifiably his. The Supreme Court will probably be faced again with the same
type of situation presented in Augenblick. That is, one of the lower federal courts
will again grant relief based upon an expanded concept of jurisdiction. However,
in such a future situation the problem may not be avoided so easily as the petitioner may also present a valid constitutional argument. In any event, it seems
that until the Court meets and resolves this problem, the military petitioner's
grounds for relief in all types of collateral actions will remain highly uncertain.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Augenblick has clearly avoided solving
the problem only confused in Burns v. Wilson. Hopefully, another sixteen years
will not pass before a proper solution is forthcoming.
Moxus

J. Num

69. See discussion note 22 supra.
70. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 351-352 (1969).
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THE ZONING VARIANCE: A NEW LOOK IN MISSOURI?
Rosedale-Skinker Improvement Association v. Board of Adjustment1

Southwestern Bell Telephone Company applied to the Building Commissioner
of the City of St. Louis for a permit to erect a four-story addition to its building
rather than the three-story addition permitted by the zoning ordinance. The
permit was refused and the Bell Company appealed to the Board of Adjustment.
The Board of Adjustment sustained the Commissioner on the grounds that: (1)
the proposed structure would violate the Zoning Code by reducing the off-street
parking space below the minimum standard, and (2) no practical difficulty
or unnecessary hardship had been shown to allow variation from the specified
height limitation. The Bell Company immediately acquired land adjoining its
property in order to provide the required parking spaces, and filed a motion for
rehearing, which was granted. During the board hearing, the company submitted
testimony that technical considerations demanded a four-story addition, that
this did not constitute a major change in the appearance of the building, and
that refusal of the permit would require the construction of a building at another
site, resulting in impairment of service and great expense to the public.2 The
board then found that a variance in height of the proposed addition was justified
because of practical difficulties and unnecessary hardship. Plaintiffs, who were the
trustees and two resident owners of a neighboring home, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to attack the legality of
the Board of Adjustment's decision. Neither party offered additional evidence to
the circuit court, and the Board's order was affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed to the
St. Louis Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment and remanded the
cause with orders to affirm the Building Commissioner's decision. The case was
then transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court to be heard as an original appeal.
Plaintiffs contended, among other things, that no practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship was established by Bell. The Court found no merit to any
of the plaintiff's contentions and affirmed the Board of Adjustment's decision
granting the variance.
The circumstances under which a zoning board of adjustment may legally grant
a variance have been a source of confusion in a majority of the states. Missouri is
1. 425 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
2. This was substantiated by testimony and photographic exhibits by the
Bell equipment engineer. Evidence was given showing the building entirely full
of equipment. Bell Company contended that there was a need for continuation
of the building at the present floor levels and height, and that if it was not
allowed to increase the number of floor levels, there would be a duplication of
facilities which would be a hardship on subscribers. When asked why the equipment could not expand horizontally, Bell's engineer testified that
[I]f you have to expand horizontally there is a possibility we wouldn't have
need for the land. To tie the equipment together to have it function, if we
have the length of the cables too long there is too much resistance and
we cannot function the equipment.
Rosedale-Skinker Improvement Association v. Board of Adjustment, 425 S.W.2d
929, 935 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
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no exception. The Rosedale case provides an important addition to Missouri case
law in this area.
A variance allows a single landowner the right to use his property in a
specific manner which is contrary to the strict letter of the zoning ordinance.
In essence, it is an exemption from the restrictions.3 The Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act provides for a zoning board of adjustment to grant a variance in
order to avoid practical difficulties and unnecessary hardship. This provision has
been adopted in a majority of the states.4 The Missouri Enabling Act follows the
Standard Act in this regard. 5
There are two recognized forms of variance. The use variance allows a use
or structure in a district restricted against such a use or structure.6 A permit for
a commercial building in a residential zone is a typical example of this variance
form. The other form, the bulk variance, is used to relieve the particular property
from hardship caused by dimensional requirements. This would exist where the
landowner makes a conforming use of the property, but does not comply with some
bulk regulation as to area, height, setback or parking. 7 The Rosedale case involved
a request for a bulk variance.
Beginning with the landmark case of State ex tel. Nigro v. Kansas CityS
Missouri courts consistently have held that neither a board of adjustment nor a
court can grant a use variance. The use variance is regarded as an amendment to
the zoning ordinance, which is solely a legislative function.9 Consequently when
3. Note, Zoning Variances, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1396 (1961).
4.

8 E.

MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 511,

§

25.159 (3rd ed.

1965).

5. § 89.090 (3), RSMo 1959. It is interesting to note that the Missouri
phrase speaks of "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship," not "practical
difficulties and unnecessary hardship." While the difference raises the question
whether the two terms have different meanings, it appears that the courts use the
two terms interchangeably.
6. See Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 76, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (1939), for
one of the best statements on when a use variance based on unnecessary hardship
is appropriate. The Otto court maintained that before a board may grant a
variance, the landowner must show that: (1) the land cannot yield a reasonable
return if used for the purpose specified in the zone; (2) the hardship is due to
unique circumstances of the particular land owner and not to general conditions
in the neighborhood; and (3) the variance will not change the essential character
of the locality.
7. Dukeminier and Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study
In Misrule, 50 Ky. L. J. 273, 281 (1962).
8. 325 Mo. 95, 27 S.W.2d 1030 (1930). In discussing the use variance the
Nigro court said:
But the board can in no case relieve from a substantial compliance with
the ordinance; their administrative discretion is limited to the narrow
compass of the statute; they cannot merely pick and choose as to the
individuals of whom they will or will not require a strict compliance
with the ordinance. State ex rel. Nigro v. Kansas City, supra at 101, 27
S.W.2d at 1032.
9. E.g., State ex rel. Meyer v. Kinealy, 402 S.W.2d 1 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966);
State ex rel. Sheridan v. Hudson, 400 S.W.2d 425 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966); Wilson
v. Douglas, 297 S.W.2d 588 (K.C. Mo. App. 1957); Adams v. Board of Zoning
Adjustment of Kansas City, 241 S.W.2d 35 (K.C. Mo. App. 1951); In re Botz,
236 Mo. App. 566, 159 S.W.2d 367 (1942); Berard v. Board of Adjustment of
City of St. Louis, 138 S.W.2d 731 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940).
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an attempt was made to circumvent this position by showing a practical difficulty
or unnecessary hardship as provided in the Enabling Act, it was held that no
matter how great the hardship, a use variance could not be granted1 0
Thus, Missouri boards of adjustment now only need to determine the circumstances under which a bulk variance may be granted. In order to obtain
such a variance, a Missouri landowner must show that conformity with the
zoning requirement would cause "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship.""1
In Carlyle-Lowell, Inc. v. Ennis'2 the court held that the existence of hardship
was a question of fact which the board was afforded wide discretion in deciding.
The appellant's contention that financial considerations could not be given
account in determining the hardship issue was rejected. But Brown v. Beuc'3
severely limited the liberal approach of the Ennis case. In Brown, the court
held that a bulk variance could be granted only when there were practical
difficulties or unnecessary hardship which were not personal to the owner of the
land in question, but which referred to the condition of the particular lot. The
hardship had to be unusual or particular to the property involved and different
from that suffered throughout the neighborhood. The court explained what this
meant by stating that the hardship must have resulted "from the peculiar topography or condition of the land which makes the land unsuitable for the use permitted in the zone in which it lies." 14 This prohibited the board from considering
evidence of a landowner's personal hardship when the condition of the land
was not the reason for the landowner's failure to comply with the zoning
ordinance.
It is undertsandable why many believed Brown to have restricted Ennis and
formulated new Missouri law. Actually, the liberal language of Ennis may have
been dicta. Although the Ennis court stated that modification of the yard and
area requirements was allowed to alleviate expense to the property owner, the
grounds for its decision appeared to be that the topography or condition of the
land would not allow the property to be feasibly developed in conformity with
the zoning ordinance.15 By viewing the decision in this manner, Brown may be

10. State v. Hudson, 400 S.W.2d 425 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966). Referring to
State ex rel. Nigro v. Kansas City, 325 Mo. 95, 27 S.W.2d 1030 (1930), the court
states:
Its language that the board can in no case relieve from a substantial
compliance with the ordinance, dearly shows that it was holding that
regardless of the practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship which might
exist, a board of adjustment does not possess the power to grant a variance
for a nonconforming use. State v. Hudson, supra at 430.
11. § 89.090, RSMo 1959.
12. 330 S.W.2d 164 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
13. 384 S.W.2d 845 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
14. Id. at 853.
15. Carlyle-Lowell, Inc. v. Ennis, 330 S.W.2d 164 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959). The
court illustrated the hardship resulting from the topography of the land when
it stated:
The lot is irregular in shape, with the front thereof being narrower than
the rear. Moreover, the east line is irregular, containing an angle. In
addition, the grades of this lot are irregular, with the grade sloping
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said to have tightened the loose language of Ennis.16
Rosedale, however, expressly rejects the language of the Brown case. The
Rosedale opinion states that the limitation to hardships resulting from the land's
topography "was not necessary to the [Brown] decision and was not based on any
specific provision in the St. Louis ordinance or the enabling act."' 7 The court not
only dismissed the limitation as mere dicta, but also as not supported by the
statutes. This approach allowed the court to return to a "common sense conclusion"' 8 that is much more flexible in considering variance applications.
Rosedale does raise an additional question concerning the circumstances
under which a variance may be granted. It has been said that a variance is only
authorized when "the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety and
welfare secured and substantial justice done . . ."19 This does not mean that
the variance must benefit public interest, but that public interest must not be
harmed by the granting of the variance.
It is difficult to formulate a general rule as to what constitutes a sufficient
hardship to justify a variance, for each case rests upon its own facts. To a great
extent, the final decision remains within the board's discretion. But following
Rosedale, the landowner will be assured of more latitude in presenting hardship
evidence. The result should be an increased number of variances.
THOmAS

N.

STERCHI

downward from north to south and with a rolling slope from west to east.
Carlyle-Lowell, Inc. v. Ennis, supra at 165.
16. Cf. State ex rel. Weinhardt v. Ladue Professional Building, Inc., 395
S.W.2d 316 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965). The court did not affirm the board's decision
on hardship, but instead affirmed the decision on grounds that the respondent
complied with the minimum parking space requirements of the zoning ordinance.
This seemed to be avoiding the issue of hardship, and recognizing the fact that
there was no hardship due to topography. The case appeared to add weight to
the Brown "limitation."
17. Rosedale-Skinker Improvement Association v. Board of Adjustment, 425
S.W.2d 929, 932 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
18. Carlyle-Lowell, Inc. v. Ennis, 330 S.W.2d 164, 169 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
19. In re Botz, 236 Mo. App. 566, 572, 159 S.W.2d 367, 370 (1942).
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